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The Former Supreme Commander, Head Of The Federal
Military Government and Nigerian Armed Forces
How Ironsi was killed, …by his ADC
By PETRUS OBI, Abakaliki
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• Senator Andrew Nwankwo |
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Photo.Sun News Publishing |
Senator Andrew Nwankwo from the Izzi
clan in Abakaliki,
He became Ironsi’s Aide-De-Camp through the recommendation of Brigadier George
Krubo who was then in-charge of the Air Force and subsequently supervised the
late Head of State’s security.
Capt. Andrew Nwankwo (rtd) said he was to die with his boss, but for fate. He
was present when both Ironsi and Fajuyi were shot dead.
Tracking the 61-year-old former ADC down in his one story building residence in
Abakaliki was not as difficult as getting him to recall the events that led to
the death of his master 38 years ago.
He would start by taking you down memory lane when he served as a courier to
late Emperor Haile Selassie of
"So when
It was part of these that Ironsi saw and handed over his security to the young
captain. "It was cool working with Ironsi, he understood everything about what I
should do because he had commanded the UN forces in
The coup
Recalling the events of that night,
The Head of State had the previous day hosted traditional rulers from all parts
of the country in the Ibadan Government House. "He wasn’t feeling quite well, he
had a knee problem and had to go to bed early.
"Lieutenant Sanni Bello was the army ADC, and we were very close. So, we left
that night to go and look out and came back late. Lt. Adamu who was the ADC to
Fajuyi, Sanni Bello, Walbe and myself, we all slept together in one room that
night".
"At about 4a.m the telephone rang, I picked it up and that was Adeola, the then
commissioner of police, Ibadan he said he wanted to speak with Ironsi, I said I
was the ADC, he said he wanted to speak with him because there was a coup and he
gave me some names Orok and two others that had been killed in
Abeokuta.
"Immediately, I made a mental picture of
it, and I knew that it was the northerners that were responsible. So, I handed
the phone to Ironsi and they talked. I then alerted Adamu and Sanni Bello and
said look, there is a coup and the trend is this way.
"
"Around
"Fajuyi later sent me outside the government House to find out what was
happening. I met Danjuma, who was then a major and he was my friend. He
pretended he didn’t know what was happening, he was asking me, and I said I
didn’t know. While I was trying to go back, one sergeant from
"It was then that Fajuyi came out to find out what was holding me, and there
inside the Government House Danjuma ordered for his arrest and mine too. That
was when I saw Walbe. Then Fajuyi asked me to take him to Ironsi so that they
will obey him, that there should be only one person in charge. So, I took them
to Ironsi, and major Newman, immediately he saw Ironsi, he seized his crocodile
swagger stick, and then they started asking him about the January coup, he said
he didn’t know about it that he only agreed to be Head of State so that he can
restore confidence and normalcy. It was immediately they arrested Ironsi that
they turned violent".
The road to the valley of death
They marched us down, Ironsi and myself,
to where Fajuyi was. They used telephone cable to tie my hands behind and my
legs, with a little space to walk. Same they did to Ironsi, but they removed his
shirt, he wore only trousers, they also tied Fajuyi. Ironsi was in a Land Rover,
Fajuyi in a mini bus and myself in another bus. They drove us towards Iwo Road,
10 km from Ibadan, there was a small forest were they stopped, marched us to the
right hand side of the bush, Fajuyi was leading and as he tried to cross a small
stream, he fell down, the soldiers were unruly, it appeared some of them had for
the first time taken Indian hemp, so when he fell down some of them started
beating him.
My escape
As Fajuyi fell down and they were beating
him, Sanni Bello came to me and tapped me and said, we could do something now.
It was providence, may be I was not destined to die. I took a few steps from
them and jumped into a nearby ditch, all in a split of a second,
The ADC, who was later elected senator in 1983 stated that the former Head of
State could have escaped if not that he wanted to make sure that there was no
bloodshed. He said if he sacrificed his life and prevented bloodshed in
The ADC denied the prevailing story that Ironsi was tied to a Land Rover and
dragged along the road. He maintained that he saw Ironsi and Fajuyi shot dead.
"They shot him on the chest and it was a burst, so he would have died after the
first shot".
The crocodile staff
It was a swagger stick, which he made
after his name Aguiyi (crocodile). It was in the Congo, when he was commanding
the United Nations Forces, the Indian troops were to land at the Lumumbashi
Airport but the Cameroon gendarmes went and blocked the place with trucks, so
that the Indian soldiers will not land, so, he used a Land Rover and with the
stagger stick waved as they were shouting, he was eventually able to convince
them to remove the trucks. Many attributed that feat to extraordinary powers in
his swagger stick. But there was nothing in it, it was just a stick. Ironsi was
not fetish; he was a devoted Catholic and attended mass every morning, even the
day he was killed.
from THE SUN
http://sunnewsonline.com/webpages/news/national/2004/june/28/nationa-june28-2004-001.htm
In July 1966, then Lt Col. Yakubu Gowon assumed the position of "Supreme
Commander" in the very tense circumstances of a violent counter-coup in which
Ironsi was killed. Gowon remained "Supreme Commander" until he gave up the title
after the Aburi meetings of January 1967. However, he re-assumed the powers of
"Supreme Commander" when he declared a state of emergency in May 1967 and
revoked Decree #8. His successor as Chief of Staff (Army), Lt. Col. JRI Akahan
later died in a helicopter crash as the civil war broke out in July 1967
EVENTS THAT LED TO HIS RISE TO POWER
In the Nigerian Army's official history of the Civil War, Major General IBM
Haruna (rtd), said: "The dominance of the NPC and the perceived dominance of the
North in the centre were like a threat to the presumed more enlightened and
better educated Southerners who believed they were the backbone of the movement
for Nigerian independence but did not succeed the colonial power to run the
affairs of the state. So with that background one can now lay the foundation of
the perception of the military struggle in Nigerian politics."
Reflective, therefore, of certain repeatedly articulated viewpoints in sections
of the Press, the opinion matured among a small budding caucus of already
politically inclined officers after independence, that every military deployment
for internal security in aid of the civil authority whose political orientation
they did not share, even if constitutional, was just another provocation.
These include:
1. 'Operation Banker', a joint Army-Police operation in the Western region, led
by then CO, 4th battalion, Lt. Col. Maimalari, allegedly at the behest of the
pro-NPC regional Premier (Akintola) culminating in the declaration of a state of
emergency in May 1962 after a fracas in the House of Assembly and the
appointment of an administrator. Interestingly, the General Staff Officer
(2) at the Army HQ in charge of Intelligence was none other than Captain
PPatrick Chukwuma Nzeogwu who, as a Major, was later to play a key role in the
coup of January 1966 in which Maimalari lost his life.2. The arrest on September
22, 1962 and subsequent imprisonment of the opposition leader, Chief Awolowo, on
suspicion of planning a civilian overthrow of the government. It was alleged
that 300 volunteers were sent to Ghana for 3 weeks militia training. Certain
accounts hypothesize two separate plots, one by Dr. Maja and the other by Awo
himself.
But there is a body of evidence that indicates that Dr. Maja was actually
collaborating with the government. The real plotters planned to exploit the
absence from the country of three out of the five Army battalions to seize key
points in Lagos and arrest leading figures of the government. The absent
battalions were in or on their way to and from the Congo. One available military
detachment at Abeokuta was out on military training exercises, while the newly
formed federal guard in Lagos was essentially ceremonial.
Thus, there was an internal security vacuum which the plotters intended to
exploit. Court records also indicate that an attempt was made to recruit
Brigadier Adesoji Ademulegun for the scheme but he refused to cooperate with the
plotters, choosing instead to remain loyal to the traditional military hierarchy
and government, which had just promoted him from Lt. Col. to Brigadier. Whether
this later played a role in his subsequent assassination in January 1966 is
unknown.
3. Army Stand-by during the acrimonious reactions to the National Census of
1962/63 aand 1963/64.
4. Army Stand-by during the Midwest referendum of 1963.
5. Mobilization of the Army to provide essential services during the General
Strike of 1964. Even this apparently innocuous deployment in support of the
civil authority attracted criticism from some of the would-be plotters of the
January 1966 coup.
Captain Nwobosi (rtd), for example, has said that as a young officer deployed to
the railways as an escort, he was troubled by the fact that the Prime Minister
left Lagos for his home town in Bauchi during the strike, leaving crucial
matters of state to assistants in Lagos as well as the Army which was fully
mobilized. I have not been able to independently verify the validity of this
accusation against Balewa, but it does provide insights into the expectations of
soldiers of their civilian masters when they are drafted by civil authorities to
stabilize the polity.
A perception of lack of a "hands on" approach, even if false, can undermine
authority and the culture of respect.
6. Tiv Crises: As far back as April 1960 and July 1961 the Army had been placed
on standby in Tiv land. This became necessary again in February 1964. However,
on November 18, 1964 the 3rd battalion under Lt. Col James Pam which was just
returning from Tanzania was deployed in full for internal security operations
there. The choice of Pam's unit was a deft move because he was of middle belt
origin and the battalion had been out of the country training another Army, and
thus insulated from acrimony. The Nigerian Army actually emerged from this
operation with high mmarks because the local people saw Pam's unit as more
neutral than the Mobile Police. Interestingly, Major Anuforo of the Recce unit
at Kaduna was deployed in support of Pam for this operation. This is the officer
who later shot him during the January 1966 coup. Other would-be plotters who
served in Tiv land were Ademoyega and Onwatuegwu.
7. Constitutional crisis of January 1965:
Following the controversial Federal Election of December 1964, ceremonial
President Azikiwe of the NCNC, urged by radical intelligentsia, refused to
invite Prime Minister Balewa of the NPC to form a government and issued orders
mobilizing the Army to enforce his authority to suspend the government, annul
the elections and appoint a temporary interim administrator to conduct
elections. However, the oath of allegiance of the officer corps was not only to
the Commander in Chief but also to the government of Nigeria.
The Army Act (#26 of 1960) and the Navy Act (#9 of 1960) were also clear on
lines of authority and control.While the Army and Navy were "under the general
authority" of the Defence Minister in matters of "command, discipline and
administration", the authority for operational use and control was vested in the
Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister. President Azikiwe and the service
chiefs were so advised by the Chief Justice and Attorney General of the
Federation.
Thus the Navy Commander, Commodore Wey politely told the President that the Navy
(under him), the Army (under Major General Welby-Everard) and the Police (under
Louis Edet) had decided to refuse his orders. After a week of cliff hanging
tension, in which the military stood aside, a political compromise was
eventually reached and a government of "national unity" formed under Prime
Minister Balewa.
In the US Diplomatic Archives: Nigeria 1964-1968, the situation was
characterized in this manner: "Very complicated African politics, in which
tribes, religions and economics all play a part, are involved in the situation.
The Northern Premier is at odds with the Eastern Premier in whose region large
oil deposits have been discovered. In the heat of the election campaign, there
have been threats of secession by the east; threats of violence "that would make
Congo look like child's play" from the north.." At the same time, strong rumors
of an impending Army coup purportedly planned for the annual Army Shooting
competition were also heard in political circles. But the status quo held,
albeit temporarily.
8. Army Stand by during the ethnic leadership crisis between Yorubas and Igbos
at the University of Lagos in March 1965.
9. Army Stand-by during the Western regional Election of October 1965 which led
to a break down of law and order. Political pressures and recrimination
resulting from this exposure finally cracked the façade of political neutrality
among some officers exposing deep personal, ethnic, regional and political
schisms in the process. To quote Captain Nwobosi again, "When I was in Abeokuta,
my soldiers were being detailed to go somewhere towards Lagos from Abeokuta to
guard ballot boxes that were not opened. They were not opened but somebody had
already been declared the winner. Everyday, they would go and come back and in
the process, I lost one of my corporals. You know soldiers are soldiers and
sometimes like children, you have your favourite ones and this was personal."
10. A subsequent alleged plan to bring the situation in the West under control
by the NPC controlled federal government in support of its regional ally, using
the Army as had been done in 1962, allegedly brought forward the date of the
January 15 coup. The coup was organized by predominantly Eastern officers
sympathetic to the UPGA alliance of political parties that had lost the 1964
federal elections and the October 1965 regional elections in the West. The
majority of casualties were Northern politicians and senior military officers
from the same alma mater all of whom were deemed to represent the NPC or its
interests. Others were politicians and officers from the western region viewed
as being in alliance with the NPC leadership.
The coup failed to bring the "young turks" who led it to power but it did
result, through a complex and controversial series of events, in the emergence
of a military regime led by General Ironsi.There is a tragic post-script to the
widely held (but false) presumption that the January 15 coup pre-empted an
inevitable military operation to crack down in the West. This presumption is
based on a reported meeting between key NPC and NNDP political leaders as well
as certain senior military officers said to have occurred in Kaduna on January
14.
===============================================================================
However, the last interview granted to the magazine 'West Africa', by the late
Prime Minister Balewa on January 14, a few hours to his death, went like this:
Question: Do you see the solution as taking the form of a coalition government
in the West?
Balewa: Yes, it would have to be that ...The Action group has accepted my
mediation, but the NNDP has asked for more time. If I use real force in the West
- and make no mistake about it, I haven't yet - then I could bring the people to
their knees. But I don't want to use force like that. Force can' t bring peace
to people's hearts.
Question: Would you consider the release of Chief Awolowo as part of a political
solution of the West's troubles?
Balewa: I think that might be part of it; yes, obviously we would have to see."
This interview was not published until January 29, 1966.
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CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE 1966
Until the coup of 1966, civil-military relations after independence basically
followed the classic model. Soldiers were rarely seen in public in their
uniforms unless there was an official event. Barracks were mostly separated and
remote from concentrations of civilian housing. Political speech making, writing
articles in the lay press without approval, or political campaigns in barracks
by or at the behest of soldiers were not allowed. Furthermore, in part because
there was no significant external threat, but also because of the predominance
of British officers at the top until 1965, the army command played very little
role in security policy making. The major foreign policy decisions of that era
were made by the political class. Even in its internal security role the Army
did not make policy. It carried them out.
However, the socialization process that made this relationship possible seemed
to be confined to the uppermost echelons of the military where officers who had
spent the longest amount of time working directly with British officers before
independence were to be found. Coincidentally, certain key officers at these
levels shared certain social origins with key political leaders. Officers at
lower and middle rungs of the ladder, however, did not share many of those
attributes because the transition from decolonization to democratization was
rushed, driven by notions of patriotism.
From October 1st 1960 until May 1st 1965 when he died naturally of an illness
Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu, the second Vice President of the Northern Peoples
Congress, served as Minister for Defence. From May 1965 until January 1966 his
place was taken by Alhaji Inua Wada, also a member of the NPC. They were both
civilians with no prior military service. Ribadu (also known as "Power of
Powers") was a very influential and highly regarded politician with extensive
connections across the political divide. His sudden death in April 1965 is said
by some to have seriously undermined the reconciliation of the frayed political
relationship between the NPC and the NCNC after the January 1965 crisis which
may have prevented the January 1966 coup. Indeed, active plotting for coup
actually began after his death that year.
Ribadu presided over a rapid expansion of the Army and Navy as well as the
creation of the Nigerian Air Force. The establishment of the Defence Industries
Corporation, the Nigerian Defence Academy, a second Recce Squadron (located at
Abeokuta) and two new Artillery batteries occurred on his watch. He got
practically all his budgetary requests through parliament including approval to
spend 19.5 million pounds on defence from 1962-66 as compared with 5.5 million
pounds during the preceding seven year period. Defence costs as a percentage of
Federal recurrent spending from 1958-1966 ranged from 7.7 to 9.9%. Defence costs
as a percentage of Federal capital spending during the same period ranged from
1.5 to 12.1%.
Pressure to expand the military did not originate from within the military. It
came from the political class. Resistance to additional defence spending did not
come from the legislature or the public. It originated in 1962 and 1964 from
other Ministers as well as economists in the Ministry of Finance concerned about
failure to meet national economic targets. Ribadu lost the Chairmanship of the
Economic Committee of the federal cabinet in 1964, a position he had used
skillfully to protect and oversee his defence appropriations. Thus civilian
oversight of military budgeting in the first republic was total and exclusive.
In my opinion, the late Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu is probably Nigeria's best
Defence Minister since Independence - a point that belies the tendency these
days to think that civilians with no military experience cannot run the Ministry
of Defence.
In addition to Ribadu there were Ministers of State for the Army and Navy. From
February 1960 until August 1961 Dr. Majekodunmi, a physician, was the Minister
of State for the Army. Then Jacob Obande held the position from August 1961
until December 1962. From January 1963 until January 1966 the position was held
by Ibrahim Tako Galadima - a personality (unlike Ribadu) whose grrasp of
military affairs and protocol was not respected within the military. Mr. M. T.
Mbu was Minister of State for the Navy from 1960 to 1966. Mr. AA Atta was the
permanent secretary from 1960-64 while Alhaji Sule Kolo held the position from
1964-66. Like the substantive ministers of that era, both were northerners.
One area in which there was direct political interference from the political
class as a group in military professional policy was in the question of quotas
for Army recruitment, which nevertheless reflected legislative pressures in a
multiethnic society. Such political pressures to apply the federal character
principle have found their way into subsequent Nigerian constitutions. Other
than one or two alleged cases, politicians generally stayed out of purely
military professional matters. Even when the departing GOC General Welby-Everard,
(for a variety of reasons dating back to events in 1951 and 1961), recommended
either Brigadier Ademulegun or Ogundipe as his successor, the Prime Minister and
the Defence Minister chose to stick with the principle of seniority and chose
Ironsi instead - perhaps mindful of NCNC sensitivities coming as it did, after
the constitutional crisis in January and around the time of the acrimonious
fight over the Vice Chancellorship of the University of Lagos.
The literature reports that Brigadier Ademulegun lobbied for the position of GOC
through his friend the Sardauna, but it would seem that the political leadership
of the Ministry resisted all such pressures. Until just before the collapse,
therefore, the link between the Army leadership and the political class was
mostly formal and appropriate. Although informal liaisons existed on the basis
of alma mater and other shared values, these did not rise to the level of the
client networks (such as "IBB Boys" or "Abacha Boys") that came to characterize
future military regimes in the country. Nevertheless, in a country where ethnic
identities were and are often stronger than professional identities, any
perceived coincidences of liaisons with the ethnic, political and security map
of the country were bound to provoke suspicion among officers who considered
themselves outside those networks.
The final intervention of predominantly eastern junior and middle ranking
military officers resulted from the gradual decline in the cohesion and
legitimacy of civilian institutions, signs of which were already evident from
the time of the December 1959 federal elections before independence.
Certain long standing colonial military policies, amplified by the fractious
nature of Nigeria's political framework set against Nigeria's unique history
provided a backdrop to contentious civil military relations after independence.
As the role of the independent army evolved from external missions and its
participation in internal security deepened, political antagonisms toward
elements of the political class were amplified as it found itself making
judgments and allocating values.
Latent societal cleavages began to undermine esprit d'Corps. It was from among
those who enlisted between 1957 (when the FDC took over from the British Army
council and introduced quotas into the rank and file) and 1961 (when quotas were
introduced into the officer corps) that the deepest schisms appeared, enabled by
other political undercurrents in larger society. As the Roman military writer,
Vegetius (De Re Militari), wrote in 378 B.C.: 'An army raised without proper
regard to the choice of its recruits was never made good by length of time.'
In the final analysis, driven by bitter fights for political control, lack of
unity in the civil class between the coalition partners, NCNC and NPC, along
with disenfranchisement of some stake-holders in the Action Group (who continued
to be loyal to the jailed Chief Awolowo) played a crucial role in undermining
whatever organized resistance (with or without British help) the political class
might have put up to save democracy when some soldiers came calling in January
1966. Indeed, military intervention may have been sought by aggrieved elements
of the political class.
As the Police Special Branch report put it: "..sometime during August 1965, a
small group of army officers, dissatisfied with political developments within
the federation, began to plot in collaboration with some civilians, the
overthrow of what was then the Government of the Federation of Nigeria."
Fearful of certain anticipated political decisions which might have involved the
use of the Army to forcefully restore order in the Akintola-led Western region
and cram the results of the controversial October 1965 election down the throats
of voters, the coup was finally launched on January 15, 1966. But as I have
noted previously, the paradox about this alleged NPC plan to "wallop" the West
is that the late Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, in his last interview just
before the coup was actually contemplating a political solution to the impasse
in the Western region, one that might even have involved a coalition government
and the release of Chief Obafemi Awolowo from jail.
At the final meeting just before H-hour in Major Ifeajuna's house in Lagos, the
Police report says "Major Ifeajuna addressed the meeting on the subject of the
deteriorating situation in Western Nigeria to which, he contended, the
politicians had failed to find a solution. He added that as a result the entire
country was heading toward chaos and disaster". One of the key participants in
the coup, Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi has also recently expressed the opinion that
there was "information" that the NPC dominated Federal Government would declare
a state of emergency in the NCNC dominated Eastern region in coordination with
an agitation for the creation of Rivers state.
In the Army's Official history of the Civil War, Nwobosi said: "Adaka Boro was
stationed in the Rivers area to start off some insurrection and the East would
have been declared an area under a state of emergency like was done in the West
under Dr. Majekodunmi." Nwobosi also said that this information "is not
something you will hear and go to sleep". Such perceptions - some of which were
plainly false-among officers with sympathies for (or views coincident with) the
United Progressive Grand Alliance, set against the NPC-NCNC-Army constitutional
crisis of January 1965 and the background tensions inherited at independence,
provided fuel for the events of January 1966.
Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi (rtd) who led operations in the West during the coup,
holds the opinion that President Nnamdi Azikiwe was briefed about the coup plot
by Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna in Lagos - but points out that his own sub-group was
not in on Ifeajuna's duplicity. He has also said that one of the intentions of
the plotters was to release Chief Awolowo from jail - a somewhat strangely
coincident plan to what Prime Minister Balewa was contemplating before he was
killed.
In the state of confusion that reigned after the Prime Minister's abduction on
January 15, refusal of the President of the Senate (Nwafor Orizu, an easterner
from the NCNC - who was also acting President) to accept the appointment by the
NPC dominated cabinet of an interim Prime Minister (Dipcharima, a northerner)
closed whatever option remained to formally invite British Troops in (with or
without a pact). With no constitutional provision for such a move, Orizu and the
rump cabinet chose to "hand over" to the Army Chief, Major Gen Ironsi, (himself
an easterner) allegedly to give him needed authority to put down the coup
attempt which had already collapsed in the south.
It appears from testimony provided by former President Shagari that the British
would likely have responded to an invitation from Acting Prime Minister
Dipcharima in the same way as they did in East Africa two years earlier. Indeed,
other sources claim that a British Battalion was already on standby.
Interestingly, recently declassified American State department archives also
show that American intervention was also contemplated in Nigerian government
circles before the rump cabinet was advised to "hand over" to General Ironsi to
"avoid disaster".
Along with the brutal and regionally asymmetric murders that accompanied the
coup, this fateful decision, which Orizu later defended as "patriotic", ushered
in a very bloody chapter in Nigerian history. However, surviving officers of the
January 15 plot (like Nwobosi and Ademoyega) seem united in their belief that it
was General Ironsi's 'misrule', rather than their unfortunate actions that
night, that led Nigeria to chaos in the months ahead
The coup report was released to very few individuals in Nigeria and certain
foreign governments in early August 1966 - and then leaked. The remainder of the
report which allegedly implicated certain other persons has apparently never
been released widely to this day. It exists, we are on its trail - and shall
publish it on sight.
1. Due to unforeseen circumstance it has not been possible, so far, to inform
the nation fully of events which took place in the Federation on 15th January 66
at Lagos, Ibadan, and Kaduna, events which were directly responsible for further
military action on the 29th July 66.
2. It will be appreciated that events of this nature require prolonged,
painstaking investigation. It is realized that the absence of legitimate
information on this subject has produced a flood of undesirable rumours and
speculation. It is, however, pointed out that without thorough investigation,
the wisdom of any premature releases, unsupported by fact, was questionable.
3. Investigations have not yet been completed but it is now possible to put the
nation, and the world, in possession of the facts so far collected. The civilian
involvement and influence in the whole affair is not as far as possible,
included in this report.
4. It has been established that sometime during August 1965, a small group of
army officers, dissatisfied with political developments within the federation,
began to plot in collaboration with some civilians, the overthrow of what was
then the Government of the Federation of Nigeria. The plan which eventually
emerged from their deliberations was that on a date not yet decided at the time,
the following action would be taken by troops from selected units, led by the
ringleaders of the plot:
a). The arrest of leading politicians at Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna, Enugu and Benin.
The plan stipulated that wherever resistance was encountered, the individuals
concerned were to be killed.
b). The occupation of key points such as radio and TV stations, telephone
exchange and other public utilities, police headquarters and signal
installations, by carefully selected troops who were not, however, to be
informed in advance of the true nature of their operations.
c). The movement of troops and armoured fighting vehicles to Jebba and Makurdi
to hold the Benue and Niger Bridges with a view to preventing the movement of
any troops, opposed to the plotters' aims, to and from the North.
d). The assassination of all senior army officers known to be in a position to
foil, successfully, the conspirators' efforts to topple the governments of the
federation.
e). The eventual take-over of the machinery of government by the rebels.
5. Although the original plan stipulated that the action intended by the
plotters should take place, simultaneously, in all the Regional capitals, no
arrangements were made to implement these intentions in Benin and Enugu.
6. The date on which the plot was to be put into execution was decided by
several factors. These include the return of the Premier of Northern Nigeria
from Mecca and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference held at Lagos
between the 11th and 13th January 66. An additional factor was the possibility
that details of the plotters intentions might have leaked out, necessitating
early implementation of the plot. In this manner, the night of 14th to 15th
January was finally selected.
7. The action which was well planned and conducted like a military operation
was, in its first stages efficiently carried out.
8. Immediately before "H" hour, which has been set for 2am on the 15th January,
a number of junior officers were taken into the confidence of the ringleaders of
the plot. It is known that a number of these were reluctant to comply with the
wishes of the plotters. Confirmed information indicates that it was made clear
to these junior officers that those who were not with the conspirators would be
regarded as being opposed to them and might suffer death as a consequence.
9. Non commissioned ranks involved in the night's activities at Lagos, Kaduna
and Ibadan, were given no previous information of the true nature of the action
in which they were about to be engaged.
10. The activities of the rebels, commencing at 2am on 15th January 66, resulted
in the deaths of the following personalities:
AT LAGOS
a. Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of the Federation of
Nigeria.
b. Chief F. S. Okotie-Eboh, Finance Minister of the Federation.
c. Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari, Commander of the 2nd Brigade NA
d. Colonel K. Mohammed, Chief of Staff Nigerian Army
e. Lieut-Colonel A. C. Unegbe, Quartermaster General.
f. Lieut-Colonel J.T. Pam, Adjutant General, Nigerian Army
g. Lieut-Colonel A. Largema, Commanding Officer 4th Battalion Ibadan
AT IBADAN
h. S. L. Akintola, Premier of Western Nigeria
AT KADUNA
i. Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto and Premier of Northern
Nigeria
j. Brigadier S. Ademulegun, Commander of the 1st Brigade NA
k. Colonel R. A. Shodeinde, Deputy Commandant, Nigerian Defence Academy
l. Ahmed Dan Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary (Security) to the North Regional
Government
m. Sergeant Duromola Oyegoke of the Nigerian Army
n. The senior wife of Sir Ahmadu Bello
o. The wife of Brigadier Ademulegun
11. In addition to the foregoing, four members of the Nigeria Police, one junior
NCO of the Nigerian Army, and an estimated number of six civilians lost their
lives during the night's events. One major of the Nigerian Army was accidentally
shot and killed at Ibadan on the 17th January 66, bringing the total loss of
life to twenty-seven.
12. Apart from the aforementioned killings, a number of political leaders and
civil servants were arrested by the plotters and detained in military
establishments at Lagos and Kaduna. These included:
a. Sir Kashim Ibrahim - at the time Governor of Northern Nigeria
b. Alhaji Hassan Lemu - Principal Private Secretary to the Premier of Northern
Nigeria.
c. Aba Kadangare Gobara - Assistant Principal Private Secretary to the Premier
of Northern Nigeria.
d. B. A. Fani-Kayode - at the time Deputy Premier of Western Nigeria.
_________________________________
DETAILS OF THE EVENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
13. In August 1965, three officers, Major Okafor, Major Ifeajuna and Captain Oji
who were already dissatisfied with political developments in the Federation and
the impact of these developments on the Army, held series of discussions between
them about the matter and set about the task of searching for other officers who
held views similar to their own and who could, eventually, be trusted to join
them in the enterprise of staging a military coup d'Etat.
14. In September 1965, Major I. H. Chukwuka of Nigerian Army Headquarters Lagos
was persuaded to join the group of conspirators, followed in October 1965 by
Major C. I. Anuforo, also of the Army headquarters. Major C. K. Nzeogwu was
brought in around that time through the efforts of Major Anuforo, an old friend
of both Majors Nzeogwu and Okafor. Major Nzeogwu in turn secured the support for
the plan of Major A. Ademoyega who had worked with him in the Nigerian Army
Training College Kaduna.
15. By early November the recruiting activities of the group were completed and
an inner circle of conspirators emerged, consisting of the following officers:
Major CK Nzeogwu
Major A. Ademoyega
Major EA Ifeajuna
Major CI Anuforo
Major IH Chukwuka
Major D. Okafor
Captain O. Oji
Planning for the execution of the plot started in earnest in early November 1965
at a meeting of the inner circle which took place in Major Ifeajuna's house in
Lagos.
16. The plan which eventually emerged from their deliberations was broadly as
follows:
a. The arrest of VIPs at Kaduna, Ibadan, Lagos, Enugu and Benin. The plan
stipulated wherever resistance to arrest was encountered, the individuals
concerned were to be killed
b. The occupation of vulnerable points such as Radio and TV stations, telephone
exchange, police signals installations, airfields and civilian administrative
establishments, by carefully selected troops who were not, however, to be
informed in advance of the purpose of their operations.
c. The movement of troops to Jebba and Makurdi to hold the Niger and Benue
bridges against any movement of troops opposed to the plotters' aims, to and
from the North.
d. The killing of all senior army officers who were in a position to foil
successfully the conspirators efforts to topple the
Governments of the Federation and who resided in the areas of operations.
e. The eventual take-over of the machinery of Government by the Army.
17. Amongst the civilian VIPs scheduled for arrest, the following have been
named:
a. The Prime Minister of the Federation
b. The Federal Finance Minister
c. The Premiers of Northern, Western, Midwestern and Eastern Nigeria.
18. Additional personalities scheduled to be arrested in Lagos were the
following:
a. K. O. Mbadiwe
b. Jaja Wachuku
c. Inua Wada
d. Shehu Shagari
e. T. O. Elias
f. Ayo Rosiji
g. M. A. Majekodunmi
h. Mathew Mbu
i. Richard Akinjide
j. Waziri Ibrahim
19. Other ranking politicians were to be placed in house arrest pending a
decision as to their disposal and eventual fate.
20. Events have shown that other political figures including the Deputy Premier
of Western Nigeria, the Finance Minister and the Governor of Northern Nigeria
were scheduled to be arrested.
21. The conspirators further decided that the following senior army officers
represented a threat to their plans and must be killed during the first hours of
the rebellion:
Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari - Lagos
Brigadier S. Ademulegun - Kaduna
Colonel K. Mohammed - Lagos
Colonel R. A. Shodeinde - Kaduna
Lt. Col. A. Largema - Ibadan
Lt. Col. A. C. Unegbe - Lagos
Lt. Col. J.T. Pam - Lagos
NOTE: Lt. Col. Largema was the CO of 4th Battalion NA stationed at Ibadan. On
15th January 66, however, this officer was on temporary duty at Lagos, staying
at the Ikoyi Hotel
22. For the actual execution of the plan, three commanders were nominated,
namely:
a. Northern Nigeria Major C.K. Nzeogwu
b. Lagos Area Major E. A. Ifeajuna
c. Western Nigeria Captain E. N. Nwobosi
23. The latter officer was not a member of the inner circle and was not
approached until either the 13th or 14th January 66. He was, however, well known
to the conspirators who were certain that when the time came he could be relied
on to cooperate.
24. The execution of the plan was to take place in three areas only, i.e.
Kaduna, Ibadan and the Lagos area, although many of the participants believed
the insurrection to be nation wide. It is a matter of established fact that no
violent action took place in either Benin City or Enugu. It has been suggested
that these areas were spared because the plotters found it impossible to recruit
reliable co-conspirators in these regions. None of the officers has indicated
under interrogation that any efforts to recruit collaborators in either Benin or
Enugu were made. Indeed subsequent action of some of the leading officers
indicated collaboration with the then Premier of Eastern region.
25. For the purposes of this report, the execution of the plan is dealt with in
three main sections, namely Lagos Area, Ibadan and Kaduna. Each section is
divided into incidents, showing the identities of officers and men involved.
LAGOS AREA:
26. The execution of the plan commenced by the calling of a meeting late on 14
January 66 of the Lagos members of the inner circle and, for the first time, of
junior officers previously selected to take an active part. A number of those
present had attended a cocktail party that very evening in the house of
Brigadier Mai-Malari in Ikoyi. The following attended this meeting which was
held in the Apapa House of Major Ifeajuna:
a. Major EA Ifeajuna
b. Major CI Anuforo
c. Major D Okafor
d. Major A. Ademoyega
e. Major IH Chukwuka
f. Captain O Oji
g. Captain GS Adeleke
h. Lt. G. Ezedigbo
i. Lt. BO Oyewole
j. 2/Lt. ES Nweke
k. 2/Lt. BO Ikejiofor
l. 2/Lt. NS Wokocha
m. 2/Lt. Igweze
27. Major Ifeajuna addressed the meeting on the subject of the deteriorating
situation in Western Nigeria to which, he contended, the politicians had failed
to find a solution. He added that as a result the entire country was heading
toward chaos and disaster. He next acquainted the junior officers with the inner
circle's plans and asked them if they were prepared to assist to put an end to
this state of affairs. Major Ifeajuna claims that all present pledged their
support for his plans with the exception of Captain Adeleke who was, however,
later persuaded to join. It was made clear to these junior officers that those
who were not with the conspirators would be regarded as being opposed to them
and might suffer death as a consequence.
28. When, at the end of the meeting, it was clear that all present were in
support of the rebellion, tasks and targets were issued as follows:
a. Abduction of the Prime Minister and the Federal Finance Minister: Major
Ifeajuna, 2/Lt. B. Oyewole, 2/Lt. Ezedigbo
b. Killing of Colonel Mohammed and Lt. Col. Unegbe: Major CI Anuforo, 2/Lt C.
Ngwuluka
c. Killing of Brigadier Mai-Malari: Major D. Okafor, Capt. O. Oji, 2/Lt. C.
Igweze
d. Killing of Lt. Col. Pam: Major IH Chukuka, 2/Lt. G. Onyefuru
e. Occupation of the Control Room at FT Police HQ Lion Building: 2/Lt NS Wokocha
f. Occupation of P & T Telephone Exchange: , Lt. PM Okocha, 2/Lt. CC Anyafulu
g. Occupation of N.E.T. Building: 2/Lt DS Nweke
But there were apparent last minute change of the plans as will be shown later
in this paper.
29. Troops selected for these various tasks were to be drawn from the following
units (all stationed or accommodated at Apapa and Dodan barracks, Ikoyi):
a. No. 1 Signal Squadron
b. Camp - HQ 2 Brigade NA
c. Lagos Garrison Organization
d. The Federal Guard Unit
30. The Federal Guard Officers Mess at Ikoyi was named as the rallying point for
all teams on completion of their tasks.
31. All other officers and other ranks to be involved, either consciously or
unconsciously in the operations were called out for alleged Internal Security
operations between midnight and 0100 hours to allow time for the issue of arms
and ammunition and the provision of the necessary transport. With the exception
of other ranks of the Federal Guard, they were all ordered to report to
Headquarters of No. 2 Brigade NA in battle order, with their arms. Ammunition
was issued to them by Lt. Okaka, assisted by Major Ifeajuna, RSM Ogbu of Camp 2
Bde and others.
32. Officers and men moved off to their various assignments at around 0200 hours
as planned.
ABDUCTION AND ASSASSINATION OF SIR ABUBAKAR TAFAWA BALEWA
33. The party charged with the abduction of the Prime Minister (PM) left HQ 2
Bde at approximately 0200 hours. The following have been identified as members
of that group:
OFFICERS
a. Major EA Ifeajuna (in command)
b. 2/Lt. G. Ezedigbo (Federal Guard Unit)
c. 2/Lt. Oyewole (2 Brigade Transport Company)
NO. 1 SIGNAL SQUADRON
NA 84254 Cpl C. Madumelu
NA 18149591 L/Cpl . O. Achi
NA 18159447 S/Sgt. A. Ogbogara
NA 18150401 Sgt. L. Onyia
NA 500147 Sgt. BS Odunze
NA 18150392 Sgt. F Impete
NA 18150400 Sgt. I Ndukaife
NA 1856 Sgmn. S. Onwuli
NA 18149817 Cpl. P. Okoh
NA 18149084 Cpl. U Eduok
NA 18150345 Cpl. Z. Chukwu
NA 18150206 L/Cpl FI Okonkwo
NA 3775 Sgmn FN Chukwu
NA 18150443 L/Cpl RC Amadi
NA 18159121 WO II J Onyeacha
CAMP - HQ 2 BRIGADE NA
NA 3339 Pte NA Evulobi
NA 18150137 L/Cpl S. Kanu
NA 502724 WO II L. Okoye
NA 124643 WO I (RSM) J. Ogbu
ARMY HEADQUARTERS (LGO)
NA 504299 Sgt. J. Nwakpura
NA503865 Sgt. B. Iberesi
NA 149820 Sgt. E. Okonkwo
NOTE: The above named were not all, of necessity, directly involved in the
abduction of the PM. A number of them operated on the premises of the Federal
Finance Minister, adjacent to the residence of the Prime Minister
34. The small convoy reached the Onikan roundabout at approximately 0230 hours
and halted near the PM's residence. Major Ifeajuna ordered all troops to leave
their vehicles and divided them into three groups with targets as shown:
PRIME MINISTER
Major EA Ifeajuna - in command
Sgt. B. Iberesi
Sgt. J. Nwakpura
Sgt. BS Odunze
Cpl. P. Okoh
Cpl C. Madumelu
Sgmn FN Chukwu
Sgmn. S. Onwuli
2/Lt. Oyewole
FEDERAL FINANCE MINISTER
2/Lt. G. Ezedigbo - in command
WO I (RSM) J. Ogbu
L/Cpl FI Okonkwo
Cpl. Z. Chukwu
Cpl. U Eduok
Sgt. F Impete
S/Sgt. A. Ogbogara
Sgt. I Ndukaife
WO II L. Okoye
ON GUARD OVER VEHICLES AND APPROACH ROADS
WO II J Onyeacha - in command
L/Cpl RC Amadi
Pte NA Evulobi
L/Cpl S. Kanu
Sgt. E. Okonkwo
35. The latter group was given the task of stopping and turning back all
vehicles approaching Onikan road. There is no record concerning their
instructions as to what action they were to take in the event of any of the
drivers refusing to obey the order to turn back.
36. The Major knocked on the gate and was answered by a policeman who was on
guard inside. The Major identified himself as an Army Officer whereupon the PC
(Police Constable) granted them access. The Major asked the PC how many men were
on guard with him and was told that there were six. The Major then ordered the
PC to show where they could be found.
The PC agreed whereupon the Major seized his rifle and passed it to one of his
men. The PC then led the group to round up the remaining members of the Police
guard. At the back of the house, ie. at the creek side, they found a PC armed
with a rifle and accompanied by a Police dog. The Major ordered the PC to
surrender his rifle, which he refused to do. He was then hit in the face by Sgt.
Odunze whereupon he capitulated and surrendered his firearm.
Major Ifeajuna ordered Sgt Odunze and Cpl. Okoh to stand guard over the PC and
his dog with orders to shoot both if they made an attempt to abscond or raise
the alarm. All the other members were disarmed and taken to the main gate where
they remained guarded by Sgt Iberesi and 2 others. They were all informed that
they would be shot if they attempted to escape or raise the alarm.
37. Major Ifeajuna and few of his men then approached the back entrance to the
Prime Minister's residence having secured the police orderly, and the stewards
under arrest, and broke into the lounge and thence to the Prime Minister's
bedroom. A voice from the inside asked who was there. The Major replied by
kicking the door open, entering the room and pointing his gun at the Prime
Minister and thereafter led out the PM wearing a white robe with white trousers
and slippers. The PM was then led away by Major Ifeajuna along Awolowo Road
where Ifeajuna had parked his car adjacent to the Onikan swimming pool.
ABDUCTION AND ASSASSINATION OF FS OKOTIE EBOH
38. On arrival at the Onikan roundabout, at approximately 0230 hrs on 15 Jan 66,
Major Ifeajuna divided his force into three groups as shown in para 34 of this
report. Major Ifeajuna and his group proceeded towards the PM's residence and
2/Lt Ezedigbo took his men to the compound of the Finance Minister. When they
arrived at the front gate, they found this locked and were compelled to gain
access by jumping over the wall. Inside they found a number of civilian guards,
about 5, who were armed with bows and arrows. These offered no resistance and
were disarmed and placed under guard. At least one policeman was encountered in
the compound. He too was disarmed and escorted to the 3-Ton truck by RSM J.
Ogbu.
39. 2/Lt Ezedigbo then attempted to open the front door but found this also to
be locked. He broke one of the panes of glass in the door with his SMG but even
failed to open the door which he finally broke down by kicking it with his boot.
He then entered accompanied by the following other ranks:
WO II L Okoye
Sgt. I Ndukaife
Sgt. E. Okonkwo
Cpl. U. Eduok
Sgt. F. Impete
Before entering 2/Lt Ezedigbo ordered his men to walk quietly and to make no
noise, a rather superfluous caution considering the noise which must have been
made when the door was broken open. They mounted the stairs to the first floor.
Having arrived there, the 2/Lt posted one man on the balcony and 3 on the
landing.
40. The officer then shouted twice "Okotie-Eboh", come out". When this met with
no response he entered a bedroom where he found the Minister dressed only in a
loin cloth. He ordered the Minister to precede him down the stairs, and the
Minister was escorted to the 3-Ton lorry. Rumors that the Minister was beaten
and otherwise ill-treated on the way to the vehicle have been stoutly denied by
all who took part in the operation.
41. Whilst the Finance Minister was being loaded into the 3-Tonner, the PM was
escorted from his house and placed into Major Ifeajuna's car. 2/Lt Ezedigbo
joined Ifeajuna whilst the ORs (other ranks) re-entered their respective
vehicles. The convoy then moved off to the Federal Guard Officers' Mess,
stopping en route at a point in Ikoyi where Major Ifeajuna and 2/Lt. Ezedigbo
killed Brig. Mai-Malari. (editors comment: Maimalari had escaped from the team
that had been sent to kill him at home)
ARREST AND ASSASSINATION OF COLONEL K. MOHAMMED AND LT. COL. A. UNEGBE
42. Meanwhile Major CI Anuforo, assisted by 2/Lt. C. Ngwuluka and the following
other ranks:
NA 173629 WO II B. Okugbe - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18149383 Sgt. J Oparah - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 1641 Cpl. C. Egwim - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18149792 Cpl. E. Nwoke - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18150530 L/Cpl. J Nwankpa - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18151259 Pte C. Unegbu - Military Hospital, Yaba
proceeded in the two private cars of Anuforo and Ngwuluka to No. 1, Park Lane
Apapa, the residence of Colonel K. Mohammed. This was then being guarded by
unarmed nursing orderlies of a Field Ambulance stationed in Apapa.
43. On arrival Major Anuforo ordered all his party to leave the cars, which had
stopped some distance from the house. They then advanced towards the house led
by Major Anuforo. They were challenged by Pte L. Onyegbule, then on sentry-go.
Major Anuforo told the sentry to "shut up" and to put up his hands. The Major
then gave orders that the sentry and the other 3 members of the guard be banded
together in one place in the custody of Pte. C. Unegbu, who although a member of
a medical unit, was then bearing arms.
44. Major Anuforo then went to the front door of the house and knocked. It would
appear that he received an answer, because he was heard shouting "You first come
out and see who is knocking". With the Major at this stage was WO II B. Okugbe.
When he received no further answer to his knocking, Anuforo ordered his men to
cock their weapons. He then kicked open the door and entered accompanied by Cpl.
E. Nwoke, WO II Okugbe and Cpl Egwim.
45. The house was searched until the Colonel was found, in night attire, in his
bedroom. The Colonel was forced out of the house by Major Anuforo and the other
ranks who had accompanied him, and put into Anuforo's car. It is believed that
before being put into the car, the Colonel's wrists were tied with a rifle sling
which was still in place when later, his dead body was discovered along the
Abeokuta road.
46. Before leaving, Major Anuforo instructed the Colonel's guard to return to
their unit and not to discuss what they had seen with anyone. Sgt. J Oparah and
Cpl. E. Nwoke could not get into the car of Major Anuforo because of the
presence of the Colonel and were odered to follow on foot to the house of Lt.
Col. Unegbe, situated on Point road, Apapa, not very far away.
47. On arrival at Lt. Col. Unegbe's house, Major Anuforo entered the house
alone. They heard SMG fire inside the compound and were later ordered to bring
out the dead body of the Lt. Col.
48. Whilst the men were inside collecting Lt. Col. Unegbe's body, Col. Mohammed
was compelled to leave the car by Major Anuforo. The latter told the Colonel to
say his prayers as he was going to be shot. The Colonel did not plead for mercy
or remonstrate in any other manner, but quietly prayed until he was shot in the
back by Major Anuforo, using his SMG.
49. Colonel Mohammed's corpse was stowed into the boot of Major Anuforo's car
while the body of Lt. Col. Unegbe was placed on the floor in the back of the
car. Anuforo and his men then entered the vehicle which was driven straight to
the Federal Guard Officers' Mess. At the Mess the two bodies were unloaded on
the ground.
This is the Police Report on the official investigation into the coup of 15
January 1966. It was prepared by Police Special Branch Interrogators based on
interviews with soldiers, other ranks and some officers who had been arrested
after the mutiny.
None of the soldiers and officers involved had come to formal trial in a
court-martial as of the time of the July 29 1966 "counter-coup". Indeed the fact
they were not court-martialed was one of the grievances listed by those officers
who carried out the unfortunate operations of July 28-August 1, 1966.
The coup report was released to very few individuals in Nigeria and certain
foreign governments in early August 1966 - and then leaked. The remainder of the
report which allegedly implicated certain other persons has apparently never
been released widely to this day. It exists, we are on its trail - and shall
publish it on sight.
ASSASSINATION OF LT. COL PAM
50. Major Chukuka assisted by 2/Lt G Onyefuru and the other ranks
NA 160152 Sgt. NN Ugongene - No. 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18150196 Sgt. H. Okibe - No. 1 Signal Squadron
NA 154544 Sgt. B. Anyanwu - Camp - HQ 2 Bde NA
NA 403298 Sgt. L. Egbukichi - Army HQ (LGO)
NA 18150416 Sgt. P. Iwueke - HQ 2 Bde NA
had by then accomplished the arrest of Lt. Col. JY Pam and was being guarded
inside a landrover in the Mess premises. Majors Chukuka and Anuforo held a brief
discussion after which both Majors entered the Landrover. The driver was ordered
to proceed to Ikoyi.
51. At a point inside Ikoyi the landrover was stopped and both Majors descended.
Major Anuforo ordered Lt. Col. Pam to leave the vehicle, which he did. Major
Anuforo then spoke to him and told him that he was going to be killed and would
do well to say his prayers first. Lt. Col. Pam pleaded but Major Anuforo
remained adamant, stating that he was carrying out orders. Then without warning
Major Anuforo fired a burst from his SMG into Lt. Col. Pam's body killing him on
the spot.
52. Major Anuforo then ordered the NCOs in the landrover to come down and load
the dead body into the vehicle. The men, who were shocked and frightened by the
killing were reluctant to comply with this order and refused to leave the
vehicle until Major Anuforo pointed his SMG at them and threatened to kill them
unless they did as they were told. They then obeyed and loaded the corpse. The
party then drove back to the Federal Guard Officers Mess where the body was
off-loaded and placed alongside the bodies of Col. Mohammed and Lt. Col. Unegbe.
ASSASSINATION OF BRIG. MAIMALARI
53. The assassination of Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari as originally conceived in the
conspirators Master plan failed.
54. Major DO Okafor and Captain Oji were present at HQ 2 Bde when troops were
being mustered and issued with arms and ammunition. When these arrangements had
been completed these two officers entered Major Okafor's personal car
accompanied by the following ORs from No. 1.
Signal Squadron:
NA 500611 L/Cpl B Okotto
NA 18150074 L/Cpl P Esekwe
55. They drove direct to the Federal Guard Unit in Dodan Barracks, Ikoyi, where,
in the meantime, Lt. Ezedigbo and 2/Lt. Igweze had roused additional troops and
arranged for the issue of arms and ammunition. By the time the troops were ready
for the alleged IS operations, Major Okafor and Captain Oji had arrived at the
barracks and were at the Unit guardroom. Major Okafor ordered that troops mount
into 2 Federal Guard Landrovers detailed for the operation by Ezedigbo
56. Federal Guard personnel detailed for this operation were the following:
NA 3785 Sgt. SA Umch
NA 18150997 Sgt. N. Ibundu
NA 18149870 L/Cpl N. Noji
NA 3995 L/Cpl HH Okeke
NA 18149870 L/Cpl P. Nnah
NA 1706 Pte. J. Ogu
NA 18149723 Pte. S. Eke
NA 18141571 Pte. I. Onoja
NA 18148787 Pte. JF Enunehe
NA 18149970 Pte. J Abaye
NA 3695 Pte. CS Dede
NA 18151261 Pte. S. Adekunle
57. The following vehicles were used:
Landrover NA 773 - driven by Pte. I Onoja
Landrover NA 957 - driven by L/Cpl N. Noji
58. The party drove direct to the house of Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari at 11
Thompson Avenue, Ikoyi. This is a corner house and situated at the point where
Brown road runs into Thompson Avenue. On arrival at their destination, the
troops were dismounted and divided into three sections commanded as shown:
No. 1 Section - Captain Oji
No. 2 Section - 2/Lt C Igweze
No. 3 Section - Sgt. SA Umch (in reserve)
59. The reserve section under Sgt. Umch was ordered to take post in a dark place
opposite the house. The three officers, followed by their men then entered the
compound which was guarded by NCOs and men of the 2 Battalion NA. Major Okafor
ordered the Sentry to call the Guard Commander whom he informed that the
situation was bad and that he, Okafor, had come to take over the guard. He
instructed the Guard Commander to assemble his men and to take them back to his
unit. The Guard Commander, according to some of the ORs interrogated, replied
that he could not obey this order as he had received no instructions to that
effect. Major Okafor and Captain Oji overruled the Guard Commander's objections
and entered the compound
60. Whilst Major Okafor was pre-occupied with the guard the telephone in the
downstairs lounge of the Brigadier's house started to ring. Some of the men
present, including 2/Lt. Igweze, have stated that the Brigadier came downstairs
to answer the telephone. No sooner had he picked up the receiver than a burst of
SMG fire was heard in the compound. This was Captain Oji firing at a member of
the Brigadier's Guard, a L/Cpl of 2 battalion. The L/Cpl was killed and his body
later placed into Major Okafor's Landrover. At the same time, L/Cpl Paul Nwekwe
of 2 Brigade Signal Troop who was on gaurd in the front of the main gate to the
compound, was hit in the neck by a bullet, thought to be a richochet.
61. Brigadier Mai-Malari, alerted to the presence of Major Okafor's force in his
compound by Captain Oji's burst of fire dropped the telephone and, followed by
his wife, was observed running into the boy's quarters. From there he escaped
into the road, and it is thought, tried to make his way to the Federal Guard
Barracks.
62. According to the ORs interrogated, Major Okafor flew into a rage when he
discovered that the Brigadier had escaped and bitterly blamed the men of the
Federal Guard for not shooting the Brigadier when they saw him running towards
the boy's quarters. He then ordered all present that the Brigadier must be shot
on sight.
63. Major Okafor then jumped into the landrover driven by L/Cpl Noji. He
informed 2/Lt Igweze that he was going to get "that man" and to arrange for more
troops to come to the Brigadier's House. He drove around the area for some time
but failed to find the Brigadier. By the time he returned to 11 Thompson Avenue,
Major Ademoyega and Captain Adeleke had arrived there in a landrover driven by
L/Cpl D. Omeru.
Major Ademoyega had already informed Captain Oji that the Brigadier had been
killed and that he had seen his body at the Federal Guard. Captain Oji was
overheard telling Okafor that "the Jack had been killed". It is presumed that by
"the Jack" Oji meant the Brigadier. Major Okafor then informed the troops with
him that Brigadier Mai-Malari had been killed by men from another unit.
64. The time, by then, was nearly 0400 hrs. captain Oji was ordered by Major
Okafor to proceed to 2nd Battalion in Ikeja to check the situation there. The
Captain left in landrover NA 773 accompanied by Sgt. H. Irundu, L/Cpl H Okeke,
Pte. S. Adekunle and Pte. I Onoja.
65. As stated elsewhere in this report, Major Ifeajuna and his convoy, after the
abduction of the PM and the Finance Minister, drove towards the Federal Guards
Officers mess where he made a brief stop and then proceeded toward Ikoyi Hotel,
still with the PM in the car. At a point in the Golf course, adjacent to a
petrol station Brigadier Mai-Malari was walking towards Dodan Barracks when he
saw Major Ifeajuna's car. The Brigadier recognized his Brigade Major Ifeajuna
and shouted and beckoned him to stop. Then Ifeajuna stopped the car and
accompanied by 2/Lt Ezedigbo went towards Brig. Mai-Malari and killed him.
66. After the Brigadier had been killed, his body was loaded into the 3-Tonner
and driven to the Federal Guard Officers' Mess.
ASSASSINATION OF LT. COL. LARGEMA
67. Although not initially alloted to Major Ifeajuna as a target for
assassination, Major Ifeajuna proceeded to Ikoyi Hotel to kill Lt. Col. Largema.
On arrival at the hotel Major Ifeajuna told the receptionist on duty that he had
an urgent message for Lt. Col. Largema of Room 115.
The time was between 0330 and 0400. He then asked the hotel receptionist to
supply him with the master key which can open all doors in the hotel but was
told that this was not available. He then ordered the receptionist to lead him
to the room in which Lt. Col. Largema was staying, warning the receptionist on
the way that he would be shot if he refused to comply with whatever he might be
ordered to do.
68. On their arrival on the first floor Major Ifeajuna, accompanied by 2/Lt
Ezedigbo instructed the hotel receptionist to knock on the door of Lt. Col.
Largema and to inform him that he was wanted on the telephone. It should be
pointed out here that rooms in this hotel have no telephones. There are situated
in small alcoves in the corridors. In the case of Room 115, the telephone alcove
is only a few paces away.
69. Lt. Col Largema responded and came out dressed in pyjamas and slightly dazed
by sleep. In the meantime the two armed soldiers had stepped back into the
corner near the lifts from where they could not be observed by Lt. Col. Largema
when he came out of his door. The Lt. Col. then picked up the receiver, which
was off the hook. At this moment both the soldiers near the lift opened fire
with their SMG. Lt. Col. Largema fell down and died.
70. The killers went downstairs and called the third man to come up. Between the
three of them they then carried the dead body down the stairs and deposited it
on the floor. They then called yet another soldier from the Mercedes car who
helped the other three to carry the body to the car. The whole party then drove
off.
71. When Major Ifeajuna and party returned to the Federal Guards Officers' Mess
he learnt that the GOC was in town and was organizing 2nd Battalion NA at Ikeja
to attack the rebels. He was then joined by Major Okafor and they drove off
together in Major Ifeajuna's car.
At the Yaba Military Hospital they dropped 2/Lt Ezedigbo who had been wounded in
the encounter with Brigadier Mai-Malari. The time was about 0400 hrs. Major
Ifeajuna drove away on to the Abeokuta road. On the way they stopped and
Ifeajuna asked the PM out of the car whence he shot and killed him. When he and
Okafor became certain that the PM was dead they left the body in the bush at a
point beyond Otta on the Lagos to Abeokuta road. They then opened the boot of
the car and dropped the body of Lt. Col. Largema near that of the PM.
They then drove on to Abeokuta. On the way after Abeokuta two other soldiers in
the car were dropped and told to find their way back to Lagos whilst Ifeajuna
and Okafor proceeded to Enugu. They arrived Enugu at about 1415 hours and
proceeded to the Premier's Lodge where they held discussion with Dr. MI Okpara,
then Premier of Eastern region, after which they separated and went into hiding.
Ifeajuna eventually escaped to Ghana where he was received by the former
President Kwame Nkrumah who sent him to Winneba to stay with SG Ikoku.
72. At the Federal Guard Officers' Mess the corpses of Brigadier Mai-Malari,
Col. Mohammed, Lt. Col. Pam and Lt. Col. Unegbe were loaded into a 3-tonner
lorry in which was sitting Chief Okotie-Eboh still alive. The time was then
about 0330 hours.
73. By this time Major A. Ademoyega and Major CI Anuforo were present on the
Mess premises. Major Ifeajuna having departed, these two officers took command
of his men and vehicles. They mounted into Major Anuforo's Peugeot car
accompanied by 2/Lt Igweze. Major Ademoyega entered the landrover.
74. On the instructions of Major Anuforo, the little convoy moved off with
Anuforo leading. They traversed Lagos and went along Abeokuta road. At a given
point, unidentifiable by the men interrogated, Major Anuforo stopped the convoy
and he, 2/Lt Igweze and Major Ademoyega left their vehicles. They came to the
tailboard of the 3-Ton truck and detailed a number of men to take position in
front and to the rear of the convoy with instructions to stop and turn back all
approaching traffic.
75. Major Anuforo then ordered the four corpses to be unloaded onto the road.
The bodies were then carried into the bush on the left hand side of the road.
Major Anuforo then observed FS Okotie-Eboh still seated in the truck and asked
the question: "Who is that man"?, which leads to the belief that, until then,
Anuforo was unaware of the presence of Okotie-Eboh in the truck. The Finance
Minister replied "I am Okotie-Eboh".
Major Anuforo then ordered the Minister to step down. The latter complied,
whereupon Major Anuforo informed him that he was going to be shot. The Minister
commenced to plead for his life. This met with little or no response from
Anuforo who is reported as having confined himself to stating that he was acting
under orders. The Minister was then forced to go into the bush, pushed along by
Major Anuforo and Major Ademoyega and followed by 2/Lt Igweze and Sgt. Ndukaife
to the spot where the bodies of the 4 senior officers had been deposited.
Arriving there, without hesitation, Major Anuforo killed Okotie-Eboh with a
short burst from his SMG.
77. Major Anuforo then returned to the road followed by the others but leaving
2/Lt Igweze, Cpl. Egwim, L/Cpl Nwankpa and Cpl. Nweke on guard over the five
bodies.
78. The convoy drove off and returned later, accompanied by 3 Ferret scout cars
which had been obtained from 2 reconnaisance Squadron at Abeokuta. Four spades
were brought out from the landrover and used to dig graves for the burial of the
corpses. The graves were dug by Cpl. C. Egwim, Cpl Z Chukwu, L/Cpl J Nwankpa and
private N.A. Evulobi. When this task had been completed, they all boarded their
respective vehicles and drove off to Lagos.
OCCUPATION OF P & T TELEPHONE EXCHANGE,
N.E.T., AND LION BUILDING
79. These three cases have been treated jointly as they are of lesser importance
and because the officers and men involved left Apapa together in the same
vehicle
80. Although it is probable that the officers concerned in the occupation of
these vulnerable points were fully aware of the purpose of their activities of
that night, they have all denied this. It is certain that none of the ORs
involved received any advance information on this subject.
P & T AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE EXCHANGE
81. After the distribution of arms and ammunition at HQ 2 Brigade, 2/Lt PN
Okocha and 2/Lt OC Anyafulu were allotted a Landrover and 3 Ors and instructed
to proceed to the P & T Exchange by Major A. Ademoyega and to wait there until
he, Ademoyega, joined them
82. They drove there and, after waiting for a very short time, Major Ademoyega
arrived in another Landrover accompanied by other officers and men. The Major
went straight to the main door and knocked. The door was opened by one of the
employees and Major Ademoyega, 2/Lt Okocha and 2/Lt Anyafulu entered,
accompanied by the Ors. The Major sent the 2/Lieutenants upstairs with orders to
bring down all the workers from the Exchange, whilst the 3 soldiers were ordered
to guard the three entrance doors of the building.
83. When all the workers were assembled, Major Ademoyega addressed them and
ordered them not to pass any calls. He reassured them that there was no danger
and advised them not to panic. He told them that he was leaving the two 2/Lts
and the soldiers at the Exchange to ensure that his orders were obeyed. After
speaking to the officer in charge of the exchange, Major Ademoyega instructed
the 2/Lts not to molest any of the workers leaving instructions that they must
not leave there until he, Ademoyega, returned to collect them.
84. Neither of these officers have admitted that they took any steps to ensure
that the automatic exchange would cease to function. An automatic exchange does
not depend upon any human agency to continue functioning and it must, therefore,
be accepted that one of these officers interfered with the installation.
85. At 0500 hours 2/Lt Okocha complained that he was unwell and left in the
landrover that had brought them there. 2/Lt Anyafulu and the 3 ORs remained in
the exchange until about 0645 hours. Seeing no sign of Major Ademoyega, Anyafulu
became worried. The workers of the day shift began to arrive but were prevented
from entering by the soldiers. He then decided to return to his unit. He gave
the soldiers some money to enable them to travel back to Apapa by bus. He too
returned to Apapa in a commercial bus and remained in his office until arrested.
NIGERIAN EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS (N.E.T)
86. After the distribution of arms and ammunition at HQ 2 Brigade, Major A.
Ademoyega ordered the following officers and ORs to enter with him into a
landrover driven by L/Cpl Umoru:
Captain GS Adeleke
2/Lt NS Wokocha
2/Lt ES Nweke
NA 18149089 Sgt. E. Ogbu - Army HQ (LGO)
NA 18150419 Cpl. H Nwegu - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 504344 Cpl. B Nwuogu - Army HQ (LGO)
NA 18150320 L/Cpl R Ejimkonye - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 504221 Sgt. F Agonsi - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18151015 Sgt. F. Eke - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18150647 Cpl. JC Iroegbulam - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 1810641 Cpl. Esonu - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18150599 Cpl. D. Oharuzike- 1 Signal Squadron
87. From Apapa the party drove straight to Lion Building where 2/Lt ES Nweke,
Sgt. E Ogbu, Cpl. H Nwegu, Cpl B Nwuogu and L/Cpl B Ejimkonye left the vehicle
and entered the building. Major Ademoyega spoke to the officer in charge and
ordered him to cease receiving or transmitting all messages. He introduced 2/Lt
Nweke as the officer who would see to it that his orders were obeyed. Major
Ademoyega and Capt. Adeleke then drove away.
88. 2/Lt. Nweke posted his men in strategic positions to prevent anyone entering
or leaving the building and remained inside the building with L/Cpl Ejimkonye to
ensure that no messages were received or transmitted. The party remained there
until 0820 hours when, in the absence of any further instructions, 2/Lt Nweke
and his men traveled to the Federal Guard Barracks in Ikoyi by taxi. On arrival
there they were arrested.
89. There is no doubt that 2/Lt Nweke was fully aware of the fact that his
occupation of the NET was connected with the rebellion of which he was informed
at the meeting of officers late on 14 Jan 66 in Major Ifeajuna's house in Apapa.
FEDERAL TERRITORY POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
LION BUILDING, LAGOS
90. As shown in paragraph 85 of this report, Major Ademoyega, accompanied by
2/Lts Wokocha and Nweke left HQ 2 Brigade at Approximately 0200 Hours in a
landrover driven by LCpl Umoru, which also contained 9 ORs
91. They arrived at Lion Building around 0220 hours where Major Ademoyega, 2/Lt
Wokocha, Sgt. F Agonsi, Sgt. F. Eke, Cpl Iroegbulam, Cpl S. Esonu and Cpl. D.
Ohazurike left the vehicles and entered the building. Cpls Ohazurike and Esonu
were posted downstairs at the security desk. Major Ademoyega spoke to the
policemen on duty there and told them that they were engaged on military
operations. He ordered them not to answer the telephone nor transmit any
telephone messages. The two corporals were instructed to ensure that the police
obeyed the Major's orders.
92. Major Ademoyega, 2/Lt Wokocha and the others then proceeded upstairs to the
Police Control Room. Here they found 4 PCs and one WPC on duty. A SPO, rank not
identified was also on duty there. Major Ademoyega spoke to the police and
ordered them not to receive or transmit any telephone or radio messages. He
informed the SPO that they were engaged in military operations and that the
soldiers were there to protect the Police.
93. At approximately 0320 hours. The GOC, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi arrived at
Lion Building in a Jaguar car. He entered the lobby holding a pistol in his hand
and asked the two soldiers on duty what they were doing there. They replied that
they did not know why they were there and that they had been brought by Major
Ademoyega. They also told the GOC that 2/Lt. Wokocha and some others were
upstairs. The GOC then ordered Cpl. Esonu to go up and to bring down the 2/Lt.
Esonu complied but could not find the control room. He came down again and
informed the GOC of his failure.
94. The GOC, after having asked the men to which unit they belonged, then
ordered them to return to their barracks immediately. He added that he did not
know what was happening but that he was turning out 2 Battalion to attack the
men then engaged on unlawful operations in Lagos. After this, the GOC left.
95. Cpl. Ohazurike then ordered Esonu to go upstairs again, accompanied by a PC,
to find 2/Lt Wokocha and to tell him of the visit of the GOC. Esonu complied and
passed the message to 2/Lt Wokocha. The latter then decided that it would be
wisest to comply with the GOC's orders. He collected all his men and went to the
Ministry of Defence where he succeeded in obtaining transport to take the entire
back to Apapa where they arrived around 0430 hours.
IBADAN - WESTERN NIGERIA
ABDUCTION OF R.A. FANI-KAYODE AND
ASSASSINATION OF S.L. AKINTOLA
96. As has already been demonstrated, Captain E. Nwobosi, OC 2 Field Battery
NNA, was taken into the confidence of the conspirators either on 13 or 14 Jan
66, whilst he was attending a Brigade Training Conference at Apapa. During the
afternoon of 14 Jan 66, he was given a set of written instructions by Major
Ifeajuna.
It is probable that these instructions included the arrest of the Premier and
Deputy Premier of the West and an order to bring these VIPs to the Federal Guard
Officer's Mess. The instruction also probably included an order to make
arrangements for a 105 mm Howitzer to be brought to Lagos after the operation.
This written instruction has not been recovered and was probably destroyed by
Capt. Nwobosi after his arrest.
97. Capt. Nwobosi was further instructed by Major Ifeajuna to stand by his
telephone in Abeokuta to await a message giving the all clear and "H" hour.
98. Capt. Nwobosi returned to Abeokuta, where he arrived around 1800 hrs. Since
the battery which he commanded was in the process of being formed and had not,
as yet, been supplied with vehicles, Capt. Nwobosi went to 2 Recce Squadron,
also stationed at Abeokuta, where he spoke to Capt. Remawa and 2/Lt. Orok.
He gave them a message purporting to have come from Major OBIENU, CO 2 Recce
Sqn, instructing these two officers to supply him, Nwobosi, with one 3-Ton truck
and a landrover. Capt. Remawa agreed and arrangements were made for the vehicles
to report to Nwobosi at midnight, with drivers. Later that evening, Capt.
Nwobosi received a telephone call from Major Ifeajuna giving him the all clear
and giving "H" hour as 0200 hours.
100. Around midnight, Capt. Nwobosi, woke up 2/Lt. A. A. O. Egbikor of his unit
and Sgt. T. Ibolegbu, the acting Battery Sergeant Major (BSM). He ordered the
latter to turn out 25 men for IS operations and to tell the Battery
Quartermaster Sergeant (BQMS), Ambrose Chukwu, to prepare all the Unit's stock
of small arms and ammunition for immediate issue to the men. Although Capt.
Nwobosi claims that he gave no intimation to anyone about the night's
operations, the interrogation of the ORs involved has made it clear that around
1930 hours he instructed certain key NCOs to stand-by for IS operations.
101. After the men had been roused, they were issued with arms and ammunition by
the BQMS. A total of 15 SLRs and 12 Sterling SMGs were issued. The two officers
drew SLRs. When issued, each SLR magazine contained 20 rounds of ammunition,
whilst each SMG magazine contained 28 rounds.
102. After the issue of arms, the men now marched to the parade ground where
they were addressed by Capt. Nwobosi who informed them that they were proceeding
to Ibadan for I.S operations. The men were then ordered to enbus. When this was
completed the vehicles contained the following personnel:
(1) Landrover
Capt: E.Nwobosi
NA 504197 BQMS A. Chukwu
NA 2630 Gnr. D. Odiachi
NA 3330 Gnr. I. Ajao
NA Gnr. S. Adefi
NA 5117 Lbdr E. Uloh
NA 5479 Gnr. R. Nwabuisi
NA 5145 Gnr. B. Akau
Driver: NA 2215 Tpr. A. Itodo (2 Recce Sqn)
(2) 3-Ton Truck
2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor
NA 502193 Sgt. T. Ebelegbu {acting BSM)
NA 18147640 Sgt. M.E. Ogaga
NA 4175 Gnr. G. Njeku
NA 4266 Gnr. B. Ifezue
NA 18144875 Lbdr. A. Aghar
NA 5792 Gnr. (lllegible)
NA 3208 Gnr. J. Echenim
NA 4195 Gnr. O.Onyekwe
NA 4337 Gnr. S. Ukelenye
NA 18151782 Gnr. B. Mba
NA 5498 Gnr. R. Gbongbo
NA 3094 Gnr. D. Ugbemoiko
NA 5789 Gnr. 0. Dasheet
NA 5675 Gnr. J. Gwaske
NA 4338 Gnr. s. Anukam
103. When all were seated, the convoy moved off to Ibadan. Whilst still in
Abeokuta, Capt. Nwobosi stopped to pick up a pregnant woman in labour and take
her to the nearest hospital. After this incident, the convoy continued on its
way uninterrupted, reaching Ibadan around 0200 hours as planned.
104. They drove straight to the P & T automatic telephone exchange in Agodi,
where Capt. Nwobosi and 2/Lt. Egbikor ordered all the employees to leave the
building, believing that this would stop all telephone communication in and out
of Ibadan. In the event, this was not the case, as the automatic exchange
continued to function and telephone communication continued unimpaired
throughout the night.
105. From the P&T the force drove to the Eleyele ECN Power Station. Here the
employees were ordered to stop the generators and to leave the building. A
number of the employees prevailed on Capt. Nwobosi to give them a lift into the
town. He obliged and dropped them near Dugbe Market, on his way to the house of
R.A. Fani-Kayode.
106. Arrived at the Deputy Premier's residence, the 3- Tonner remained outside
and the landrover drove into the compound. Of two policemen on guard at the
gate, one escaped and the other was overpowered and put into the landrover. A
number of persons believed to have been thugs were seen in the compound, but
these absconded when they caught sight of the armed soldiers.
107. All the men were ordered to take up defensive positions around the house.
Capt. Nwobosi then shouted "Fani-Kayode: Come down you are for lawful arrest by
the army". A voice from upstairs replied affirmatively to the Captain's summons,
but nothing stirred. Nwobosi repeated his call once or twice and eventually
fired a round from his SLR into the ground. When this failed to produce any
reaction from Fani-Kayode, the Captain ordered the following to accompany him
into the house:
(1) 2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor
(2) BQMS A. Chukwu
(3) Gnr. I. Ajao
(4) Gnr. S. Adefi
(5) Sgt. T. Ibelegbu
108. To gain entrance, Capt. Nwobosi was compelled to break a glass panel in the
door with his SLR. He reached in, turned the key and opened the door. The small
party then entered and mounted the stairs where they found Fani-Kayode in a
bedroom. He raised his hands above his head and said "I surrender". Capt.
Nwobosi replied "you have wasted a lot of time - we could have shot you. This is
a lawful arrest by the army". Fani-Kayode was then escorted downstairs and put
into the landrover after his hands had been tied together, with a rifle sling.
From upstairs a-woman's voice was heard shouting "Don't kill him".
109. All the men were then assembled and mounted into their respective vehicles.
They drove straight to Premier's Lodge, directed by Fani-Kayode. When they
arrived, they had to overpower the police guard consisting of 1 Corporal and 5
PCs. These were put into the 3- Tonner under guard. The landrover then drove in
and was parked facing the main entrance porch. At this time the security lights
were burning and the lodge emergency generator was running.
110. The men were disposed around the building in strategic positions whilst
Capt. Nwobosi went to the generator room to switch off the lights. Whilst he was
there according to the landrover driver, Tpr. A. Itodo, a shot was fired. It was
believed that this was the shot fired by Capt. Nwobosi, which killed the
generator attendant. His body was later found with a bullet wound in the back of
the head.
111. It is known that by the time S.L. Akintola had been informed by the wife of
R.A. Fani-Kayode of what had happened by telephone. Akintola had returned from
Kaduna only a short time before the arrival of Nwobosi and his men. He had been
to the North to greet the Sardauna when the latter arrived from Mecca. Akintola
must have been further alerted by the commotion caused by the overpowering of
the police guard and the killing of the generator attendant.
112. All dispositions having been taken, Capt. Nwobosi stood in the middle of
the courtyard and shouted "Akintola come down - you are for lawful arrest by the
army on orders from HQ 2 Brigade. A voice from upstairs, presumably that of
Akintola, replied "Yes, I am coming" Nothing further happened. Capt. Nwobosi
repeated his summons a number of times without reaction from Akintola. He then
fired from his SLR one round at the building. When this produced no result, the
Captain ordered the following to accompany him into the lodge:
(1) 2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor
(2) BQMS A. Chukwu
(3} Gnr. S. Adefi
(4} Gnr. I. Ajao
{5) Gnr. B. Akau
(6) Gnr. J. Gwaske
(7) LIBdr E. Uloh
113. To gain entrance, Captain Nwobosi was compelled to force the main door to
the lodge. They all entered and mounted the stairs. On the first floor they
searched a number of rooms without encountering anyone, until they came to S.L.
Akintola's bedroom which was locked. When Nwobosi was about to force this door,
Akintola opened fire from inside the room with an SMG, shooting through the
closed door. This first burst of fire immediately wounded Gnr. S. Adefi in the
hand, 2/Lt. Egbikor in the head and Capt. Nwobosi on the left cheek. None of the
injuries were sufficiently serious to impede them. Nwobosi and his men
immediately returned the fire whilst retreating down the stairs. They then left
the house in a hurry and sought cover amongst the flowerbeds facing the back
building.
114. Two of the men, L/Bdr. Uloh and, Gnr. Ajao remained upstairs and sought
refuge in one of the other rooms. Akintola came to the room covering the
entrance porch and continued to fire at his assailants with his SMG without,
however, hitting anyone. Capt. Nwobosi ordered his men to return the fire which
they did, massively. Akintola continued firing until he ran out of ammunition.
115. Around this time R.A. Fani-Kayode was heard shouting from the landrover to
Akintola urging him to surrender. Akintola, now defenceless, decided to
surrender and was next seen coming out of the front room, by Gnr. Ajao. When
Akintola saw Ajao and Uloh he raised his hand in surrender and went downstairs.
Capt. Nwobosi in the meantime, was heard shouting repeatedly "bring him out,
bring him out".
116. Capt. Nwobosi then ordered 2/Lt. Egbikor and BQMS A. Chukwu to shoot the
Premier. These two opened fire on Akintola with their SLRs, joined, shortly
afterwards, by Nwobosi himself. S.L. Akintola fell down dead or dying with
several bullets in his body.
117. After the killing of Akintola, Capt. Nwobosi assembled his men, released
the captured policemen and drove off. This time he was joined in the landrover
by 2/Lt. Egbikor. They stopped at a roundabout near the Central Police Station,
where Capt. Nwobosi ordered Sgt. T. Ibelegbu to proceed independently to
Abeokuta with orders to collect a 105 mm Howitzer from the battery gun park
together with a team of 12 gunners, and to drive to 2 Battalion, Ikeja. There,
Ibelegbu and his party were to await the arrival of Capt. Nwobosi.
118. On the way out of Ibadan, R.A. Fani-Kayode begged Capt. Nwobosi to be
released. The Captain refused this request and informed Fani-Kayode that he had
orders to bring him to the Federal Guard Officers' Mess in Lagos.
119. The party drove direct to Dodan Barracks where they arrived around 0700
hours, having left Ibadan at approximately 0400 hours. On their arrival they
were all arrested.
120. The party travelling in the 3-Tonner with the 105 mm Howitzer was arrested
on arrival in 2 Battalion lines, Ikeja.
KADUNA, NORTHERN REGION
121. Major C.K. Nzeogwu of the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) at
Kaduna was appointed by the "inner circle" as the commander of the rebellion in
the North. The manner in which this was to be organised appears to have been
left entirely to him.
122. The record does not show that any officers, other than Major Nzeogwu, in
the North were taken into the confidence of the inner circle. It is, however,
probable that some time before the rebellion Major Nzeogwu obtained the
co-operation of Major T. Onwatuegwu and Captain G. Ude, both of the NMTC.
123. Whereas in the West and in the Lagos area military movements by night were
not unusual as a result of the disturbed conditions then prevailing, this was
not the case at Kaduna. It was, therefore, necessary that a cover be provided
for the proposed rebellious activities, at the same time creating a reason for
bringing troops out of barracks by night without alerting the senior officers of
1 Brigade to Nzeogwu's intentions.
124. It has been established that Military night exercises in the Kaduna area,
organized by the NMTC, then under the command of Major Nzeogwu commenced in
early December 65, leading up to Exercise Damissa on 13 and 14 Jan. 66. By then
the population of Kaduna and the Police were accustomed to troop movements after
dark.
125. The master plan of the inner circle made provision for the arrest of a
number of leading political personalities who were not to be killed unless they
offered resistance. This may well have been true as far as the West, Mid-West
and the East were concerned. In view of Major Nzeogwu's activities at the
Premier's Lodge in Kaduna, however, it is thought that this officer had no
intention of abiding by these decisions but was determined, from the start, to
kill the Premier of the North at any cost.
PART 111- EXECUTION:
126. The details of exercise DAMISSA are not relevant to this report. Suffice it
to say that the night exercise of 13 Jan 66 took place in the area of the
Ministers' quarters in Kaduna, whereas that of 14 Jan 66 was held in the bush
some 5 or 6 miles outside Kaduna along the Zaria road.
Units involved
l27. On 14 Jan 66 troops from the following units took part in Exercise DAMISSA:
(1) 3rd Battalion NA -"C" Company
(2) N.M.T.C.
(3) No. 1 Field Squadron NAE
(4) No.2 Field Squadron NAE
(5) 1 Brigade Transport Company NASC
(6) lst Field Battery NAA
Arms and Ammunition
128. Troops proceeding on military training exercises by night or by day were
normally issued with their arms, either without ammunition or with blanks.
129. As far as can be established, this practice was first deviated from on Jan
13 66 when, at approximately 0900 hours Major Nzeogwu handed the Acting RQMS of
the NMTC, Ssgt. J. Daramola, a list of live ammunition required for Exercise
DAMISSA. This NCO handed the list to Cpl. E. Aiyikere, the arms storeman, with
instructions to draw this ammunition from the NMTC Magazine at Kawo. This was
done and the ammunition was issued in bulk at approximately 1730 hours on 14 Jan
66 by Ssgt. Daramola and CMS Oko (also of NMTC).
130. This list of ammunition issued is not available but it has, however, been
established that at least 6 x 84 mm projectiles for the Carl Gustav Anti-Tank
gun were issued to Sgt. Yakubu Adebiyi, an instructor in the Tactical Wing of
the NMTC. These were loaded into a landrover whilst the bulk of the small Arms
Ammunition drawn was loaded into a 3-Tonner driven by NA/ 18266054 Pte. Clement
Agbe of 1 Bde. Transport Coy. This driver subsequently transported the
ammunition to the DAMISSA exercise area.
Briefing
131. Exercise DAMISSA terminated at approximately 0130 hours on 15 Jan 66.
Around that time all officers engaged in the exercise with the exception of the
officers of 1st Field Battery NAA, were called by Major Nzeogwu to attend an "O"
Group in the bush at which, they believed, the success or otherwise of the
exercise was to be discussed. Identified as present at this discussion are the
following:
(1) Major C.K. Nzeogwu )NMTC
(2) Major T. Onwatuegwu )NMTC
(3) Captain G. Ude ) NMTC
(4) 2/Lt. S. R. Omeruah )3rd Bn NA - "C" Coy
(5) 2/Lt. D.K. Waribor )
(6) Capt. B. Gbulie )at the time in command of lst and 2nd Field Squadron NAE
(7) 2/Lt. Ileabachi )
(8) 2/Lt. Kpera ) lst Field Sqn NAE
(9) 2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik )
(10) Lieut. E. Okafor )
(11) 2/Lt. Ezedima ) 2nd Field Sqn NAE
(12) 2/Lt. H.O.D. EGHAGHA )
132. The officers of 1st Field Battery NAA were not called to the "O" Group for
reasons which are not altogether clear. No direct use in connection with the
rebellion was made of this Battery that night.
133. When all the officers were assembled, Major Nzeogwu addressed then on the
subject of the rapidly deteriorating political and security situation in the
Federation. He claimed that a stage had been reached at which the politicians
should be told to quit. To accomplish this, he announced, the army had decided
to take over power by force of arms.
He compared the incomes of the politicians with those of Nigerian workers and
urged the officers to support the rebellion. He further announced that the
revolt was taking place simultaneously in all regional capitals and at Lagos and
that, therefore, they need fear no repercussions as a result of the activities
in which they were about to participate that night. It would appear that none of
these present raised a dissenting voice. In fact, their subsequent actions
showed, in most cases, enthusiastic support for the plan.
134. Major Nzeogwu then proceeded to issue set tasks to each officer present.
Events have shown that, subsequently, last minute changes in these plans were
made. The tasks allotted have been established as follows:
Occupation of Vulnerable Points
135. The officer in over-all charge of this part of the operation was Capt. B.
Gbulie. He claimed to have distributed tasks as shown below on the spur of the
moment:
(1) Ammunition Service Depot (ASD) -2/Lt. Ileabachi
(2) P & T Telephone Exchange -2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik
(3) N.B.C. House -2/Lt. Kpera
(4) BCNN Radio & TV Station -2/Lt. Ezedima
(5) State House -2/Lt. Okafor
(6) Road Blocks on Kachia Road near PMF Barracks -2/Lt. Eghagha
136. In addition, Capt. Gbulie was instructed to rouse the following officers to
inform them of what was taking place and to ask for support:
(1) Capt. P. Anakwe - 1 Bde Staff Capt. "A"
(2) Major A.A. Keshi - Brigade Major
(3) Capt. L. Dillibe - 1 Bde Staff Capt. "Q"
(4) Lieut. J.C. Ojukwu - 1 Recce Squadron NA
(5) Lieut. Ikeachor
(6} Lieut. Mohammed Eandiya
Capt. Gbulie has stated under interrogation that he complied with this order and
caused these officers to foregather at HQ 1 Bde where he informed them of the
situation.
137. As far as has been established, the following officers were then detailed
for tasks as shown:
(1) Assassination of Alh Sir Ahmadu Bello
Major C.K. Nzeogwu
2/Lt. K.D. Waribor
2/Lt. S.E. Omeruah
Capt. G. Ude
(2) Assassination of Brigadier S. Ademulegun
Major T. Onwatuegwu
(3) Assassination of Colonel R.A. Shodeinde
2/Lt. K.D. Waribor
(4) Abduction of Sir Kashim Ibrahim
Major T. Onwatuegwu
(5) Abduction of Makaman Bida - Regional Finance Minister
Major C.K. Nzeogwu
138. After the officers had been briefed they were sent to join their men and to
proceed immediately with the execution of the tasks allotted to them. It is not
clear whether or not Major Nzeogwu instructed the officers to inform their men
of what was afoot. It is certain that the men of 3rd Battalion who were to be
used for the attack of the Premier's Lodge were not briefed. It is equally
certain that Capt. Gbulie addressed all the men of the Engineers under his
command and spoke to them along the lines in which Major Nzeogwu had briefed the
officers.
139. Immediately after the "O" Group, senior NCOs of all units represented were
sent to the 3~Tonner containing the ammunition and order to draw ammunition for
their men. In the case of the "C" company this raised a problem. The men
believed the exercise to be finished and a number of them queried the reason why
they should be issued with live ammunition. This was explained to them by 2/Lt.
Waribor who told them that they were proceeding on Internal Security Operations.
140. After the issue of ammunition had been completed, the entire force left the
exercise area and proceeded to its allotted targets.
141. The following officers and ORs have been identified as having been involved
in the attack on the Premier's Lodge:
Officers
(1) Major C .K. Nzeogwu - NMTC
(2) 2/Lt. K.D. Waribor - "C" Coy, 3rd BN NA
(3) 2/Lt. S.E. Omeruah - "
(4) Capt. G. Ude
Other ranks
(1) NA 18147406 Sgt. Husa Kanga - NMTC
(2) NA l8149900 Sgt Yakubu Adebiyi - NMTC
(3) Sgt Duromola Oyegoke . NMTC
(4) NA 5888 Pte. Ogbole Agwu - 3rd Bn NA
(5) NA 2405 Pte Bello Mbulla - 3rd Bn NA
(6) NA 18151763 L/Cpl . Samuel Amajo - 3rd Bn NA
(7) NA 18151319 L/Cpl Danyo Mbulla - 3rd Bn NA
(8) NA 5684 Pte. Abu Odiedier - 3rd Bn NA
(9) NA 18148998 Pte Lekoja Gidan-Jibrin - 3rd Bn NA
(10) NA 163287 Cp1. Bako Lamundo - 3rd Bn NA
(11) NA 5860 Pte. Joseph Wadu Goji -3rd Bn NA
(12) NA 1982 Pte. Alexander Agbe - 3rd Bn NA
(13) NA 18151864 Pte Lagwin Goshit - 3rd Bn NA
(14) NA 18266006 Pte Augustine Oguche Agbo - 3rd Bn NA
(15) NA 634212 Pte Effiong Atkinson - 3rd Bn NA
(16) NA 18147284 Cpl. Tunana Bangir - 3rd Bn NA
(17) NA 18l49368 Cpl. Abibo Elf - 3rd Bn NA
(18) NA 18151873 Pte. Uguman Monogi - 3rd Bn NA
(19) NA 1562 Pte Felako Kwa - 3rd Bn NA
(20) NA 18149363 Cpl. Reuben Nwagwugwu - 3rd Bn NA
(20) NA 502542 Cpl. Yakubu Kaje - 3rd Bn NA
(21) NA 505092 L/Cpl. Mamis Hundu - 3rd Bn NA
(22) NA 18151861 L/Cpl Thaddens Thamyil Tsenyi1 - 3rd Bn NA
(23) NA l8148269 L/Cpl Issna1m Tayapa - 3rd Bn NA
(24) NA 18148272 L/Cpl Ali Shendam - 3rd Bn NA
(25) NA 18151771 Pte. Usuman Gabure - 3rd Bn NA
(26) NA 18149613 Pte Emmanue1 Ekwueme - 3rd Bn NA
(27) NA 4887 Pte Erastus Nakito - 3rd Bn NA
(29) NA 3659 Pte Jonathan Anahiri - 3rd Bn NA
142. When this force left the DAMISSA exercise area, it was led by Major Nzeogwu
who was travelling in a landrover accompanied by a driver and two OR's. He was
followed by another landrover containing Sgts. Adebiyi, Manga and Oyegoke who
were armed with two 84mm Carl Gustav Anti-Tank Guns and 6 projectiles.
143. Following this were a number of other vehicles, landrovers and 3-Tonner
containing 2/Lts. Waribor and Omeruah and troops from "C" Coy 3rd BN NA.
144. On arrival at the main gate to the compound, Major Nzeogwu found 4 PCs on
guard in front of the gate. They were the following:
(1) No.8301 L/Cpl. Musa Nimzo
(2) No. 10674 PC. Akpan Anduka
(3) No. 18913 PC Hagai Lai
(4) No. 18920 PC Peter Attah
145. Major Nzeogwu, who was armed with a sterling SMG, ordered the constables to
face the wall. Attah complied with this order but the three others refused.
Without further ado, Major Nzeogwu immediately opened fire on them with his SMG
killing all three on the spot.
146. Immediately after the killing of the policemen, Major Nzeogwu ordered the
two men with the guns and the 3 NMTC Sergeants to follow him into the compound,
bringing with them the Carl Gustav guns and the projectiles for these weapons.
147. Immediately inside the compound, Major Nzeogwu stationed the Carl Gustavs
some 10 yards apart facing the lodge. The gunners were Sgts. Oyegeke and Manga,
whilst Sgt. Adebiyi acted as ammunition number. As soon as both guns had been
loaded, Major Nzeogwu ordered the NCOs to open fire at the Lodge. Both fired
their projectiles bursting inside the ground floor rooms of the building. Sgt.
Adebiyi stated that he then ran towards Sgt. Manga to help this NCO reload.
Whilst he was with Manga he heard Major Nzeogwu shouting repeatedly "Fire you
bastard, fire". Immediately after this both Manga and Adebiyi heard a burst of
SMG fire. They turned round and observed Sgt. Oyegoke slumped on the ground
bleeding from multiple wounds. It was clear to both that their colleague had
been killed by Major Nzeogwu either for refusing to obey or because he attempted
to run away.
143. After the killing of Oyegeke, Major Nzeogwu ordered Sgt. Adebiyi to take
over Oyegeke's gun and to continue firing at the house. Both Adebiyi and Manga,
frightened by Oyegoke's killing, continued to fire as ordered. They used a total
of 5 projectiles. As a result the building caught fire.
149. Whilst all this was happening, 2/Lst. Waribor and Omeruah had arrived with
the men from 3rd BN who were rapidly deployed around the outer perimeter wall of
the lodge. Although these men heard the bursting of the Carl Gustav projectiles,
the SMG and SLR fire and the screaming of women and children inside the
compound, they were in no position to observe what was happening.
150. 2/Lt. Waribor, whilst deploying his men, instructed them to shoot anyone
they observed attempting to leave the compound. A number of civilians, including
women, however, were seen running and crying and Major Nzeogwu firing at them
with his SMG.
151. NA 502342 Cpl. Yakubu Kaje of 3rd BN NA reports that, at a given moment, he
observed a civilian coming out of the Lodge armed with a sword. The corporal and
the men with him stopped the civilian and ordered him to drop the sword. At this
moment, according to the corporal, Major Nzeogwu arrived on the scene and asked
the civilian, in Hausa, for the whereabouts of the "master of the house". The
man replied that he did not know, whereupon Major Nzeogwu threatened to kill him
unless he led him to his master. The man then agreed and led Major Nzeogwu to
the back of the building. A shortwhile afterwards, the corporal states, he heard
a number of shots fired. Assuming that Kaje is telling the truth, it is probable
that the Sardauna of Sokoto died at that moment.
152. Cpl. Kaje has further reported that when the firing ceased, Major Nzeogwu
came from the compound and was met at the gate by 2/Lt. Waribor, who asked the
Major: "Did you get the man?", to which Nzeogwu answered, "Yes". When Major
Nzeogwu left the compound he stated for all to hear, exultantly, "I have been
successful, he is dead".
153. It has not been possible to establish the circumstances in which the senior
wife of the deceased Premier was killed. The same applies to the death of one
Zaruni, the Premier's personal body-guard. It is presumed that they died at the
same time as the Premier.
154. With regards to the killing of Ahmed Ben Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary
(Security) in front of the Lodge, none of the men interrogated has admitted to
having witnessed this. Ahmed Ben Musa was shot dead in his car by a number of
unidentified soldiers, having arrived at the Premier's Lodge after being alerted
by the police. Presumably the soldiers had ordered Musa to drive away but he
could not do so for some unexplained reason. They then killed him.
ASSASSINATION OF BRIGADIER S. ADEMULEGUN
155. The following have been identified as having been involved in the killing
of this senior officer and his wife at No.1, Kashim Ibrahim Road, Kaduna at
approximately 0200 hours on 15 January 1966:-
(1) Major Timothy Onwatuegwu (NMTC)
(2) NA 18265005 Spr. Yakubu Dungo 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(3) NA 18266079 L/Cpl . Lawrence Akuma 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(4) Spr. Raphael O1atunde 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(5) James Aluta 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(6) Emmanuel Udo 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(7) Simon Agi 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(8) Felix 0. {Snu) 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE {now NMTC)
(9) L/Cpl . Mu1i {Snu) 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE {now NMTC)
(10) NMT Cp1. Yakubu Bako 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(11) Spr. Mathew Asanya 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(12) Joseph Odion 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(13) Spr. Henry Va1ia 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE
(14) NA 18149929 Pte. Geofrey Eborendu 1 Bde. Tpt Coy NASC
156. After the briefing at the DAMISSA "O" Group by Major Nzeogwu at 0130 hours
l5 Jan 66, Major Onwatuegwu entered a landrover driven by No. NA 18149929 Pte.
G. Eberandu of Bde. Tpt. Coy. With the exception of L/Cpl. Lawrence Akuma all
the men mentioned were made to enter this vehicle and another landrover.
157. Before leaving the exercise area these men drew ammunition from the
3-Tonner already referred to in this report. They had already been briefed as
what was expected from them that night by Capt. Gbulie, the OC. The two vehicles
then moved off to the junction of the Lagos Zaria roads where they stopped. Here
the men from one of the landrovers were transferred to a 3-Tonner whilst the
empty landrover containing only the driver and L/Cpl. Muli was despatched to the
Air Force Base by Major Onwatuegwu.
158. When L/Cpl. Muli returned, the convoy, now consisting of 2 landrovers and
one 3-Tonner, proceeded to the residence of Brigadier Ademulegun. At some
distance from the house, variously estimated at between 100 and 400 yards, all
three vehicles stopped. Major Onwatuegwu ordered a section of men under L/Cpl.
Muli to accompany him towards the house.
159. The Brigadier's house was guarded by L/Cpl. Lawrence Akuma and three
sappers of 2 Field Squadron NAE. When the Major and his party arrived, L/Cpl.
Akuma and the two sappers were on the verandah of the house whilst one sapper
was patrolling the grounds. The latter challenged Major Onwatuegwu when he
approached. He was disarmed and escorted to the house where he was made to join
the guard commander and the other two members of the guard. They were all placed
in the custody of a number of soldiers.
160. Major Onwatuegwu, accompanied by a number of soldiers entered the house. A
short while after this, the guard heard several shots fired upstairs after which
the Major and his men returned. The guard were placed into the 3-Tonner truck
and driven to HQ 1 Brigade where they remained until released in the morning.
ASSASSINATION OF COLONEL R.A. SHODEINDE
161. The only persons positively identified as having been involved in the
murder of this senior officer are the following:-
(l) Major C.K. Nzeogwu - NMTC
(2) Major T. Onwatuegwu - NMTC
(3) Lieut. G.E. Nwokedi - NMTC
162. It will be recalled that at the briefing by Major Nzeogwu, it was 2/Lt.
Waribor who was allotted the task of killing the Colonel, after the attack on
the Premier's Lodge 2/Lt. Waribor has stated that after the completion of his
task at the Premier's Lodge, he was ordered by Major Nzeogwu to effect the
arrest of Makaman Bida before proceeding to Col. Shodeinde's residence. He was
unable to do so, because he did not know the address of the Colonel, and
therefore, returned to Brigade
Headquarters.
163. Mrs. Shodeinde has stated that at approximately 0300 hours on Jan 15. 66
she heard the sound of three vehicles stopping in front of her house.
Immediately afterwards she heard a voice which she identified as that of Major
Nzeogwu, calling her husband's name. The Colonel was fast asleep. She left her
bed and switched on the lights. As she did so, the men outside started to shoot
at the doors and windows of the house and she was immediately wounded in the
left hand. The door then flew open and about ten soldiers rushed into the room.
Amongst these she identified Major Nzeogwu, Major Onwatuegwu and Lieut. Nwokedi.
164. By this time the Colonel was awake and sitting up in bed. Mrs. Shodeinde
started to cry and beg for her life. Nzeogwu assured her that they had not come
to kill her but her husband the Colonel. When she continued shouting, the other
soldiers shot at her legs, wounding her several times.
165. Major Nzeogwu and the others then commenced firing at the Colonel whilst
still in bed, who fell down dead or dying by the side of the bed. Mrs. Shodeinde
then fled from the room and ran for shelter to the servant's quarters where she
remained until the attackers left.
ABDUCTION OF SIR KASHIM IBRAHIM -
GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN NIGERIA
166. This abduction was accomplished by the persons involved in the
assassination of Brigadier S. Ademulegun. Their names are, therefore, not
repeated here.
167. After killing the Brigadier, Major Onwatuegwu ordered his men to re-enter
their vehicles and drove straight to the Governor's residence. On arrival a
number of men were deployed around the house whilst the Major entered
accompanied by a number of unidentified soldiers.
168. The house was then being guarded by the following police constables:-
(1) No.11258 PC Benson Sihindatiya
(2) No.185 " Yohana Garkawa
(3) No.1391 " Johnson Lamurde
(4) No.18909 " Warzar
169. At approximately 0245 hours Major Onwatuegwu and his party reached the
residence, according to PC Lamurde. The Major was then in the landrover. The
first landrover containing some 7 men stopped. The man jumped out and
overpowered the PC on duty. The Major then entered the building.
170. Whilst the Major and his party were inside, the military personnel who
remained outside the building heard a burst of SMG fire. It is certain that this
burst of SMG fire killed PC Yohana Garkawa. PC Sihindatiya was disarmed by 4
soldiers and dragged to the police guard room where he saw the dead body of PC
Garkawa. The soldiers pointed at the body and said "Do you see your brother?".
They then instructed him to lead them to the bedroom of the Governor. When he
stated that he did not know where the Governor was sleeping they threatened to
kill him. By that time, however, the Governor had been found by other soldiers
reaching the residence. He was brought out and made to enter the 3-Tonner and
was driven to HQ 1 Brigade
171. Simultaneously with the Governor, his two ADC's Messrs. Noman Dikwa and
Garba Lango, were abducted and driven to 1 Bde HQ in the landrover containing
Major Onwatuegwu.
ABDUCTION OF MAKAMAN BIDA -
NORTH REGIONAL FINANCE MINISTER
172. This attempted abduction (or assassination) failed because the Minister was
not in his house that night, having traveled to Bida, his home town, the
previous day. The incident is, however, worth reporting, because during the
search of the Minister's residence one man, Ahmadu Pategi, a Government driver,
was killed by Lieut. Waribor who mistook him for the Minister.
173. Among those taking an active part in this incident the following have been
identified:-
(1) 2/Lt. Waribor - NMTC (other names are illegible)
174. After the completion of the operation at the Premier's Lodge, 2/Lt. Waribor
met Major Nzeogwu near the main entrance to the Lodqe. The Major had been
wounded during the attack and had bloodstains on the right side of his face and
his shirt. The Major ordered Waribor to take his platoon to the house of Makaman
Bida, to arrest the Minister and to take him to Brigade Headquarters.
175. Waribor complied with the order, and drove straight to the Minister's
house. On arrival he deployed his men around the house and called in a loud
voice upon the Minister to surrender. This brought no reaction so he forced open
the door with the intention of searching the house. At this moment Major Nzeogwu
arrived. The Major ordered Waribor to search the ground floor whilst he,
accompanied by a number of men from 3rd Brigade NA went upstairs.
176. Waribor's search downstairs proved fruitless. He collected about 3 house
servants and questioned them as to the whereabouts of their master. They claimed
that the Minister had traveled to Bida and was returning in the morning. Whilst
he was questioning the servants outside the house, Waribor observed a man
running from the house with his face covered.
Believing this to be the Minister, Waribor fired at the man and killed him. He
then went to the body, and after removing the cloth from the man's face, found
that he was mistaken. It was later established that the body was that of Ahmadu
Pategi, a Government driver attached to the Minister.
177. Major Nzeogwu, having failed to find the Minister upstairs then came down
and enquired from Waribor why he had fired his SMG. Waribor explained after
which Nzeogwu ordered him to accompany him to the house of Colonel Shodeinde,
who according to the plan was to be killed that night. The Major then drove off
before Waribor had a chance to assemble his men and to mount into the vehicles.
Since Waribor did not know Col. Shodeinde's address and the Major had departed
without him, he had no choice but to return to Brigade Headquarters.
OCCUPATION OF OTHER VULNERABLE POINTS
178. This was carried out by the officers named in paragraph 135 of this report
without producing any incident of interest to this enquiry. 2/Lt. H.O.D. Eghagha
whose task it was to set up a road block on the Kachia Road near the Police
Mobile Force Barracks was instructed to prevent the PMF from travelling into
Kaduna. This, it is thought, implied that he and his men were to attack the PMF
should they move out in strength. It has been established, however, that 2/Lt.
Eghagha instructed his men not to molest the PMF as these were too few in number
to affect materially the rebellious operations of that night. It is a fact that
the majority of the Northern PMF were, at that time, serving in Western Nigeria.
THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE
179. Although not directly involved in any of the incidents reported on in this
document, there is no doubt that the Nigerian Air Force played a comparatively
important role in the rebellion under the command of 2/Lt. Godfrey Ikechukwu
Amuchienwa of the Military Training and Security Squadron NAF at Kaduna.
HOW HE WAS KILLED
On July 29, 1966, mutinous soldiers, taking a cue from their colleagues
elsewhere surrounded the premises, arrested the General and his host and
eventually kidnapped them both, taking them to mile 8 on Iwo road where they
were shot and buried.
July 1966 coup, many Northern officers, including Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed
argued for the secession of the North from Nigeria. [Note that it was the
irascible Murtala Muhammed who along with Major T. Y. Danjuma and Martins Adamu
planned the July 29 coup, and Muhammed used his role as Inspector of Signal to
expedite and facilitate the unfolding dynamics and ruthlessness of the
blood-letting that followed the coup]. However, many prominet civilians argued
strongly against the breakup of the country, and the Northern officers
acquiesced to keeping their units in Lagos only on the condition that Lt. Col.
Yakubu Gowon, the Army Chief of Staff and the most senior Northern officer,
assume control of the government. On August 1, 1966.
[Excerpt in Quotes]
==============================================
"Once it became obvious to northern soldiers in Lagos that killings had started
in Abeokuta, Murtala Mohammed, Martin Adamu and others got themselves organized
and launched operations in Lagos to "adjust" to the situation. Meanwhile,
wearing a borrowed uniform, Major TY Danjuma, who was accompanying General
Ironsi on a nationwide tour, cordoned Government House Ibadan with troops from
the 4th battalion and arrested the General, along with Colonel Fajuyi. Shortly
thereafter, certain junior officers and NCOs pushed Danjuma aside, took control
of the situation and abducted both men. They were later shot. It was
subsequently alleged that Muhammed used his key position as Inspector of Signals
to communicate messages to northern conspirators in other parts of the country
urging action. It was also alleged that he was the leader of the initially
separatist faction among northern troops in Lagos and at one point commandeered
a passenger jet to transport northerners out of Lagos back to the North in an
apparent move to secede. This murky charge has never been satisfactorily
explained and it is hard to get consistent accounts about it. As things settled
down after the initial orgy of killings in Abeokuta, Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna,
the tentative Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (who was then Chief of Staff, Army,
professionally senior to Muhammed, and by no means privy to or part of the coup)
emerged as the choice of the northern rank and file, barely edging out the
charismatic Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed from the position of C-in-C. The bad
feelings generated by this power rivalry was to dog their relationship from then
on." [Nowa Omoigui, cited from: www.gamji.com/nowa2.htm]
THE GATHERING STORM
Below is a transcript/complete account of how the July 29, 1966 coup was
reported by Arthur Nwankwo & Samuel Ifejika in their book titled: "Biafra: The
Making of a Nation" published by Praeger Publishers, (c) 1969, pp. 156-159. In
presenting this account, I have relied exclusively on excerpts and corroborative
accounts of Nwankwo & Ifejika (1969), and a recent book "Politics in Nigeria"
(2002) published by Oladimeji Aborisade (a Yoruba) and Robert J. Mundt( an
American), both of them internationally recognized scholars in the academia.
There is a 30 year gap between both texts, but despite the time lapse, the
original account remain the same and both of them corroborate each other. Unlike
Nowa Omoigui, I refuse to inject my personal opinions, speculations, biased and
one-sided interpretations, or make any attempt to conflate facts from fiction.
Please read this with great objectivity and save it for history. I have asked
the webmaster of gamji.com (Dr. Iro) to publish this account on gamji.com, at
least to counteract Nowa
Omoigui's incessant lies and bigoted anti-Igbo misrepresentations of events in
Nigeria's tumultuous history. If the webmaster can be fair as well as
professional, he would publish this account of the event of the July 29, 1966
Northern coup and the accompanying pogroms directed at the Igbos. For a complete
list of the more than 300 Igbo military officers killed during the July 1966
coup, please consult Chuks Iloegbunam's "Ironside," or Robin Luckham,s "The
Nigerian Military" (1971), Cambridge University Press. [Please compare to Nowa
Omoigui’s adulterated and superficial account above and you can see why Nowa
Omoigui remains an unreliable and dubious individual and has no credibility at
all in relating the actual events].
THE JULY 29, 1966 COUP: IRONSI MUST DIE
****************************************
The aim of the July 29, 1966 coup (massacre) was two-fold: (1) To split the
country and effect the secession of the North from the rest of Nigeria; and (2)
in the alternative, to re-establish the hegemony and domination of the North in
the federation. In accordance with these aims, the Federal Military Government,
as led by General Aguiyi Ironsi had to be overthrown and the General himself
must be eliminated. Lt. Col Yakubu Gowon was selected as the man who would
replace Ironsi. He had been General Ironsi's Army Chief of Staff (Defense
Headquarters) and a member of the Supreme Military Council. He had returned to
Nigeria from Britain less than forty-eight hours before the Revolution of
January 15, 1966, and subsequently a member of the Supreme Military Council.
This shows the amount of confidence General Ironsi reposed in him - a confidence
he betrayed. His position gave him the opportunity to study the inner workings
of the National Military Government, preparatory to his revolt.
On July 28, 1966, General Ironsi addressed the country's natural rulers at
Ibadan. In the evening he retired to the Government house, Ibadan, with his
host, Lt. Col. Adekunle Fajuyi, the West Military Governor. With him were Lt.
Col. Hilary Njoku, Officer Commanding the 2nd Brigade, Lt. Nwankwo, the Supreme
Commander's Air Force aide-de-camp, and Lt. Bello, his Military aide-de-camp.
Late that evening, the "Araba" was launched into operation in many parts of the
Federation, Southern Nigerians in General Ironsi's body guard were removed, and
a group of twenty-four Northern soldiers was sent to reinforce the remaining
Northerners. Before midnight the Ibadan Government House was already surrounded.
Meanwhile operations had started at Abeokuta in Western Nigeria. A group of
Northern soldiers broke into the officer's mess and shot Major Obienu, Lt. Orok
(both Easterners, and Lt. Okonweze (Mid-West Igbo). An alarm was sounded, and
Southeners who responded to it were arrested and locked up in the guardroom and
the armoury, which had by now been emptied of its contents and converted into a
guardroom. The Northern troops, now fully equipped with arms and ammunition
taken from the armoury, went hunting, both in the barracks and in the adjoining
civilian houses, for Southern troops who had failed to answer the alarm. Some of
those caught were locked up, others were shot at sight, depending on the whims
of their Northern captors. Later the Westerners were sifted out from the other
Southerners and released. At sunrise, the non-commisioned officers (NCOs)
amongst the detainees were brought out and shot, their bodies being bundled into
a vehicle which was made available for the purpose.
Back in Ibadan, news of the disorders had reached the Government House. The
Supreme Commander's Military ADC, Lt. Bello (a Northerner) had disappeared. So
had Lt. Col Fajuiyi's ADC. Following a brief conference between the Supreme
commander, his host and Lt. Col Njoku, it was decided that Njoku should hurry
down to Lagos in plain clothes, take over control and quell the uprising. On his
way, a group of Northern soldiers fired at him, wounding him in the thigh. He
returned fire and made straight for the University Teaching Hospital, Ibadan. He
had scarcely been admitted there for treatment when his assailants tracked him
to the hospital. Fortunately, with the help of some hospital staff, he managed
to escape to the Eastern Region.
UPSTAIRS AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE, IBADAN:
THE ABDUCTION
The sound of the exchange of fire warned Ironsi and his host that they were in
trouble. So they sent Lt. Nwankwo downstairs to find out what was happening.
When he got downstairs, the Lt. was arrested and detained by the guards. When he
did not return for some time, Lt. Col. Fajuiyi himself went downstairs and was
himself arrested and detained. At about 9 am on July 29, Major T. Y. Danjuma,
who was in command of the guards, took some men upstairs, and after quizzing the
Supreme Commander, saluted him and ordered his arrest.
The three captives were stripped naked, tied up and, amidst floggings and
beatings, bundle into separate police vans. Led by Lt. Walbe, Lt. Paiko, Warrant
Officer I. Baka and Company Sergeant-Major Useri Fegge, the special team
selected for this purpose took the captives to a smal stream about 10 miles
along the Ibadan-Iwo road, where the torture continued. At this stage Lt.
Nwankwo escaped. Enraged by this, Lt. Walbe and his men sprayed Major-General
Ironsi and Lt-Col. Fajuiyi with machine gun bullets.
[NOTE: This very chronology of events is equally corroborated by Oladimeji
Aborisade & Robert J. Mundt, in their recently published book: "Politics in
Nigeria" (2nd Ed.), New York: Longmans Publishers, 2002. Dr. Aborisade is a
Lecturer in Political Science at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife; and Robert
J. Mundt was a late Professor of Political Science at the University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill].
According to Aborisade & Mundt (2002, pp. 16), "At about 5.am the Government
House (Ibadan) was surrounded and their guards disarmed. Ironsi himself was not
confronted until 9.am when Major Danjuma of the 4th Battallion went upstairs in
the Government House with an escort, saluted him, questioned him, and ordered
his arrest."
[But in the account written by Nowa Omoigui on the Hausa-Fulani website called
Gamji.com, He unreservedly and falsely exonerated Major T. Y. Danjuma of “being
there,” of having any role and complicity in the abduction of General Ironsi and
murder of the General. Nowa Omoigui wrote “that Danjuma was pushed aside at the
Government house by junior officers,” who then, arguably, took charge of the
situation and thus proceeded to arrest and eliminate Ironsi. This assertion is a
complete misrepresentation of truth and total lack of human conscience on the
part of Nowa Omoigui. I will let you be the judge on Nowa Omoigui's ignoble role
at disinformation and revisionism of the most disingeneous kind].
At the Letmank Barracks, Ibadan, the process was the same as at Abeokuta. The
armoury and magazines were siezed by Northern troops, the alarm was blown, the
Southern soldiers arrested, and the non-commisioned officers of Eastern origin
among them were shot and bundled away in a waiting van. Then there followed a
room-to-room hunt for Eastern soldiers, but this time the killings and arrests
were accompanied by the raping of wives and looting of property of Easterners.
There were, however, a few differences. At 10 am (July 29), Lt. Col. J. Akahan,
Commanding Officer of the 4th Battalion at Ibadan, called an officer's meeting.
He did not attend. The officers of Eastern origin who attended were arrested and
locked up in the guardroom. At night they were transferred to the tailors' shop,
into which were thrown hand-grenades. The few surviving officers were shot as
they tried to escape. Their corpses were bundled into a van and conveyed to a
mass grave already prepared at the outskirts of the town. The next day, Lt-Col.
Akahan disarmed the Northern soldiers and caused it to be announced that the
fleeing officers should return, as their safety was now assured. Some Eastern
officers who were in hiding in the city returned, but, at night, Northern
soldiers attacked them with guns and knives, killing all they caught. Those who
escaped fled to the East.
The same pattern was followed in the remaining Southern military stations -
Apapa, Ikeja, Lagos island and Yaba. [Major Okafor, the erstwhile Commander of
the vaunted Brigade of Guards was buried alive].In the absence of General
Ironsi, Lt-Col. Gowon was in overall command, and thus had a free hand to direct
the operations. He later moved to Ikeja, where he established his headquarters.
It is pertinent to note that, for over twenty-nine days after July 29, the
Northern Nigeria secessionist flag of red, yellow, indigo, green, and khaki
stripes was flown in the Ikeja Barracks. (So Eastern Nigeria was not the first
to embark on a secessionist bid).
In the North, the pattern was not much different except that operations did not
start until the night of July 29. Here, however, ghastly bestialities were
committed in broad daylight, and here too the atrocities were committed by both
civilian and military authorities alike. In Kaduna, The Eastern officers were
rounded up, sentenced to death and taken in batches to a waiting firing squad in
the outskirts of town. In Kano, an alarm summoned the soldiers for parade at the
basketball pitch. Then, as in other places, the Easterners who were present were
arrested and locked up. Some were removed to unknown destinations. Others were
tortured and eventually murdered. Some managed to escape and, after sleeping in
the bush for days, finally found their way to the East. There were many who did
not make it, however. The unfortunate ones ran into search parties of
Northern soldiers, who invariably shot them at sight. [Elsewhere, Lt-Col. Okoro
was tricked to a side ‘garage’ by one of the Northern soldiers under his command
who proceeded to shoot him point blank]
One thing that is perculiar to the July operations is the revolting bestiality
that marks every aspect of it. Some victims were not even given the 'mercy' of a
quick death from a bullet, but were slaughtered with knives. Others were made to
swim in ponds of faeces for several hours before being finally shot. It is
difficult to understand the depth of hatred that must have driven Northern
soldiers to these sadistic acts, the more so when it is realised, that, a few
hours before the holocaust, the Eastern soldiers shared the same sleeping
accommodations and dined at same table with their executioners. It cannot be
argued that these killings were a sudden outburst of pent-up grievances. All
available evidence points to a detailed and exhaustive programme - a
premeditated and cold-blooded extermination of Easterners in the army. This is
borne out by the uniformity of the procedure for carrying out the massacres in
the different military stations, with slight modifications depending only on the
degree of bestiality of the commanding officer and the whims of the
executioners. The scrupulous separation of Western Nigerians from the
Easterners before the latter were executed goes a long way to support
pre-meditation. The genocide of the later months of 1966 is still more
conclusive as evidence.
Another point which must be mentioned here is that the killing of the Eastern
soldiers was indiscriminate. No attempt was made to ascertain whether any
Eastern soldier was Igbo, Ibibio, Efik, Ijaw or Ogoja. As soon as the Yorubas
were sifted from the detained
Southerners, the rest, including Mid-Westerners were marched off to the firing
squad, which is usually preceded by some torturing. Of the total 43 officers
killed, 33 were Easterners, 7 from the Mid-West, and 3 from the West. The number
of other ranks killed is estimated at 200, but, due to the fact that records of
newly trained soldiers are not available, only 170 can be accounted for. Of
these 153 were easterners, 21 Mid-Westerners, and 3 Westerners.
In the East, the operation Araba was a a complete failure in spite of the fact
that, of the 950 soldiers in the 1st Battalion at Enugu, 700 were Northerners.
By a stroke of sheer luck, Captain Ogbonna had escaped the killings at Abeokuta.
Not realising the extent of
the plans, he phoned the Quarter-Master General of a number of military stations
to report what he believed to be an isolated mutiny. Fortunately the
Quarter-Master General at Enugu (a Northerner) did not receive the call having
gone out to get the Northern soldiers ready in full war dress. As soon as the
report reached Lt-Col. Ogunewe, the officer commanding the 1st Battalion, he
contacted Lt-Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Eastern Military Governor, who took
immediate precautionary actions. He ordered the immediate disarming of all
soldiers, sealed off the armoury, called in the mobile police Force, and moved
into the Police Headquarter from where he contacted Brigadier Ogundipe, Chief of
Staff, Supreme Headquarters, and the next senior officer in the absence of
General Ironsi, whom he urged to assume command and leadership. In the course of
his discussions with Ogundipe, he learned that the rebels were in firm control
of Lagos and would only agree to a ceasefire on two conditions:
(1) the the republic of Nigeria be split into its component parts,
(2)that all Southerners resident in the North be repatriated to the South, and
all Northerners resident in the South be repatriated to the North.
As Aborisade & Mundt (2002, pp. 17-18) report that "in the confusion following
the July 1966 coup, many Northern officers, including Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed
argued for the secession of the North from Nigeria. [Note that it was the
irascible Murtala Muhammed who along with Major T. Y. Danjuma and Martins Adamu
planned the July 29 coup, and Muhammed used his role as Inspector of Signal to
expedite and facilitate the unfolding dynamics and ruthlessness of the
blood-letting that followed the coup]. However, many prominet civilians argued
strongly against the breakup of the country, and the Northern officers
acquiesced to keeping their units in Lagos only on the condition that Lt. Col.
Yakubu Gowon, the Army Chief of Staff and the most senior Northern officer,
assume control of the government. On August 1, 1966, Gowon announced by radio
that he had taken the title of Supreme Commander and Head of the Military
Government. One major figure was not a party to this agreement and immediately
denounced it: the Military Governor of the Eastern Region, Col Ojukwu.
PLANNING TO OVERTHROW GENERAL IRONSI
There is no doubt that fairly soon after January 15, the motive for a northern
counter-coup also known as "return match" was established. What remained were
the means and the opportunity. In Kaduna, the Platoon Commanders Course at the
NMTC provided an opportunity for young northern subalterns to come together to
share ideas and vent frustration. These officers included Lts. Shelleng,
Hannaniya, Muhammadu Jega, Sani Abacha, Sali, Dambo and others. They held secret
meetings and even wrote a letter of protest to the Chief of Staff (Army) - Lt.
Col. Gowon - openly stating that if senior northern officers did not take action
within a certain time frame, they would, and that senior northern officers would
have themselves to blame for the catastrophe. Indeed, the Ironsi government was
sufficiently alarmed that on at least two occasions the course was suspended.
For a brief period, thereafter, things were relatively quiet, but not for long.
Matters began to stir in Lagos.
Although it is said that practically all northern officers serving in Lagos,
Abeokuta, Ikeja and Ibadan eventually became involved, three officers formed the
innermost circle of the plot to overthrow Major General Aguiyi Ironsi. They were
T/Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed (Inspector of Signals), T/Major TY Danjuma (General
Staff Officer II, SHQ) and Captain Martin Adamu (2nd Battalion, Ikeja). The coup
leader was T/Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed.
According to late Major General Garba (rtd), others involved in planning in the
South include Captain JN Garba, Lt. William Walbe and Lt. Paul Tarfa (Federal
Guards), Lts. Muhammadu Buhari and John Longboem (2nd battalion), Lts. Pam
Nwatkon (Abeokuta garrison, Recce), Lts Jerry Useni, Ibrahim Bako and Garba Dada
(4th battalion, Ibadan), and Lt. Shehu Musa Yar'Adua (Adjutant, 1st battalion,
Enugu). Air force conspirators included Majors Musa Usman and Shittu Alao.
However, other officers were clearly involved because Muhammed compartmentalized
the planning and also encouraged officers to recruit additional local
conspirators and storm troopers. Examples include Lts. Nuhu Nathan and Malami
Nassarawa at Ikeja, IS Umar in Abeokuta, Abdullai Shelleng, Haladu, Magoro,
Obeya and Onoja in Ibadan and Captains Jalo and Muhammadu Jega in Enugu, among
others.
Active planning for the coup began after the promulgation of the Unification
decree. In fact there was a brief scare in Kaduna when false rumors of Lt. Col.
Hassan Katsina's arrest in Lagos by Ironsi after the May riots rent the air.
Katsina had gone to Lagos for a meeting at which fruitless efforts were made to
get the decree repealed. When he eventually returned to Kaduna he found the
airport surrounded by irate northern soldiers.
Captain Garba was recruited in Lagos by being told that northerners were
planning a coup to "pre-empt" an expected one by Igbo officers. This so called
expected Igbo coup was also known as "Plan 15" - part 2 of the so called final
solution to the northern problem perhaps (as the propaganda went) made all the
more urgent by the killings of Igbos in the North during the May riots. Lagos
conspirators, who were being closely watched, met in various locations,
including their private cars, Muhammed's house, Garba's house, and during games
at Abalti barracks.
At Ibadan, Lt. Col. Muhammed would often drive into town from Lagos, pick up
Ibrahim Bako and Abdullai Shelleng at a pre-arranged location and drive around
without stopping while they discussed.
The Kaduna group was not as formally organized as the
Lagos-Ikeja-Abeokuta-Ibadan axis at this stage although it later consolidated
and was in the habit of having meetings at Lugard Hall with northern civilians.
However, Capt. Ahmadu Yakubu was the liaison who would drive from Lagos to
Kaduna with messages from Lt. Col. Muhammed for Lts ADS Wya, Ibrahim Babangida,
Garba Duba, BS Dimka, Dambo, Sani Abacha, Hannaniya, Salihi and others. Messages
were also passed to the 5th battalion in Kano under Lt. Col Shuwa primarily for
reasons of coordination. But Lagos was to be the fulcrum.
In order to keep tabs on what was going on inside the government, Lt. Col
Murtala Muhammed maintained contact with northern civil servants in Lagos (like
Muktar Tahir), while Captain Baba Usman of military intelligence provided
insights into what the Army knew and did not know. Nevertheless, the Ironsi
government had other mechanisms of information gathering outside official
channels. For example, at least one officer, Lt. Jasper, then the intelligence
officer at the 4th battalion in Ibadan, was suspected of passing information
directly to Supreme HQ and perhaps even to Ironsi himself, bypassing the Army.
All sorts of self appointed civilian informants were also known to mill in and
out of Army formations passing rumors to Igbo commanders who would then find
ways to get it to Ironsi. Major Danjuma, at that time a staff officer, was
attached to General Ironsi as a military scribe, dutifully taking notes at his
public hearings.
At the outset of planning for the coup, late General Garba says in his book
'"Revolution in Nigeria", Another View', that "We intended explicitly to kill no
one. The aims were, firstly, to get Decree No. 34 abrogated; secondly, to bring
the coup makers of January 15 to trial; thirdly, to accord due honour to the
military and political leaders - especially the Prime Minister - who had been
killed."
However, as we now know, the rebellion was anything but bloodless as other
agendas took center stage when all hell broke loose. Garba insists that there
was no specific plan to annihilate all Igbo officers and soldiers - although it
appeared so to neutral observers from the way many northern NCOs (aided by some
officers and civilians) were carrying on with reckless abandon and total
disregard for life and property. Garba himself admits that they went "berserk".
The late General says, though, that had there been such a formal plan, specific
Igbo officers would have been targeted and "no one would have escaped".
In my view, it is hard to know what to make of this comment, seeing as it means
little considering the scale of killings. Nevertheless, thankfully to God,
although many died, most Eastern officers, the vast majority being completely
innocent of any connection either to the January 15 coup or to the Ironsi
government, survived the July 29 rebellion. Unfortunately, thousands of innocent
civilians were murdered in orgies of deliberate and mindless bloodshed that
began in May and continued until September. There can be no justification for
what transpired, although the circumstances have been explained and the
sensitivity of the issues involved better understood with the passage of time.
Interestingly, the vast majority of those soldiers detained for the January coup
escaped primarily because they had been kept in jails located in the eastern
region.
As planning developed, loose as it was, it was influenced (as are all coups) by
issues of timing and opportunity. It is said that at least four plans were
discussed. The first was to seize State House and place the Head of State under
arrest. However, this would have entailed much bloodshed because of the security
set up inside the State House grounds, bristling with weapons. In any case the
General was also fond of leaving without warning to sleep on a Boat along the
Marina which, on occasion, would set for sea. A decision was, therefore, made to
stage the coup when he was outside Lagos to minimize bloodshed. The second was
when initial plans were being considered for the transfer of the 1st battalion
at Enugu to Ibadan in exchange with the 4th battalion. Lt. Shehu Yar'Adua was to
be the coordinator of that plan. He would create some kind of confusion as a
signal for the coup. This too was put off, likely because the decision to
exchange both battalions also kept being put off and was not formally announced
until late July. In any case, rumors (again, without foundation) soon had it
that the regime may have been aware of a "battalion switch plot" and that the
4th battalion would be derailed by Igbo sappers.
On July 14, however, the government announced plans for General Ironsi to
undertake a Nationwide tour. The tour would take him first through Abeokuta,
Ibadan, Kano, Kaduna, Zaria, Jos, and Benin. He would return to Ibadan from
Benin for a meeting of traditional rulers on July 28, spend the night, return to
Lagos on July 29 and then resume his tour in early August to the East. The third
plan, therefore, was to abduct General Ironsi during a visit to the North on
July 19th. It too was put off, some say in deference to northern traditional
leaders, while others say it was for reasons of military coordination. For one,
Ironsi hardly slept outside Lagos thus reducing the window of opportunity to get
him, and secondly, then Captain Garba, who was practically in command of the
Federal Guards company in Lagos was scheduled to be in Fernando Po for a
basketball game and would not be on the ground to help seize the capital.
The fourth plan, therefore, was to take place on July 28/29 during Ironsi's
visit to Ibadan for the National conference of traditional rulers when he would
be arrested by troops from the 4th battalion. His decision to spend the night
there, guarded by the 4th battalion, provided a perfect opportunity. The code
word for the coup was "Aure", a Hausa word for "marriage". Conspirators in
southern Nigeria made coded reference to it by talking about "Paiko's wedding",
Paiko being the nickname for (and hometown in Niger Province of) one of the
northern subalterns at the 4th battalion who was to be the spearhead. But even
this plan was put off by Lt. Col. Muhammed when it became apparent to him and
Captain Martin Adamu that it had leaked, likely through Lt. Jasper. This is why
Major Danjuma did not go to Ibadan with his combat dress.
A rough plan for early August when Ironsi would be in the East was thus
discussed but not finalized. Nevertheless, Captain Baba Usman (GSO II, Int) had
left for Enugu to coordinate with Lt. Yar-Adua when news of what happened in
Abeokuta on July 28 came through, taking him by surprise. He is not the only one
who was taken by surprise. Difficulty in getting the message of cancellation
across to all parts of the country and all conspirators without using regular
Army signals (then dominated by southerners) led to some complications
elsewhere, including Kaduna, where Lt. BS Dimka was arrested on July 27/28 by
Major Ogbemudia for attempting to break into the armoury, albeit drunk. As will
be apparent later, a combination of panic, unplanned coincidences and accidents
eventually triggered off the July 29 rebellion when northern NCOs at Abeokuta
took matters into their hands.
ABEOKUTA GARRISON, THURSDAY, JULY 28, 1966
Shortly before 2300 hours on July 28, 1966, Lt. Col. Gabriel Okonweze, Commander
of the Abeokuta Garrison was tipped off by Lt. Col. Patrick Anwunah, General
Staff Officer (1) for Intelligence at Army HQ in Lagos, that the long
anticipated Northern counter-coup was scheduled to begin that night. What
Anwunah did not know for sure was that the coup had in fact, once again, been
put off by its chief planners on account of a leak.
Earlier that evening Anwunah had confronted Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed in Yaba,
Lagos with information that he was behind a planned counter-coup, leading to a
mean-spirited (some say violent) exchange between them. Anwunah initially
thought this confrontation would in fact deter the plot from going forward, and
planned to do nothing. But having been prompted by Lt. Col. Alexander Madiebo to
take some precautionary steps, and perhaps being in receipt of additional
information, he took it upon himself to alert some unit commanders, one of whom
was Okonweze. (An alternative account says Okonweze was also alerted by Njoku)
Lt. Col. Okonweze, therefore, called a meeting in the mess of all available
officers (Igbo and non-Igbo) at the Abeokuta Garrison where he made the
following announcement:
Gentlemen, I have just been informed that there is going to be a coup tonight.
Anyone of you who knows anything about the coup should please tell us. You may
know the beginning but you never know the end. I am not ambitious. My only
ambition is to become a full Colonel. If you know anything, please let me know;
I am not going to report anyone. What we are going to do is to avoid what
happened in January where officers were taken unawares. We are going to wake up
all soldiers, ask them to go to the armoury to get issued with arms and
ammunition.
Officers present included Okonweze himself, Major John Obienu (Recce Commander),
Lt. Gabriel Idoko, Lt. DS Abubakar ("Datti Abubakar", Recce), Lt. IS Umar, and
Lt. AB Mamman (Arty). Lt. E.B. Orok (Recce) later came in his Volkswagen.
Captains M. Remawa (Recce 2ic) and Domkat Bali (Artillery Battery Commander)
were at the Abeokuta club. Captain Ogbonna (Infantry company commander) was also
in town.
Thereafter, an Igbo NCO went around the barracks, waking soldiers excitedly and
saying "Come out, come out, there is trouble; go to the armoury and collect your
armour."
This alert woke up Sergeant Sabo Kole, an NCO from the Bachama area of Adamawa
State. In the charged atmosphere of prevailing rumors at that time, Kole wrongly
interpreted the Igbo NCO's actions as an attempt by Okonweze to selectively wake
up Igbo soldiers who would thus have an advantage in what was alleged to be an
effort to finish what they did not finish in January. He, therefore, woke up
another neighbor, Corporal Maisamari Maje, also Bachama, who happened to be the
armourer of the unit. He told Maje to go to the armory and ensure that only
northerners would be issued weapons. Meanwhile, assisted by Corporal Inua Sara,
he mobilized a small guard of northern soldiers to protect the armory against
any attempt to dislodge them while he made arrangements to disarm the
quarter-guard. Having secured the armory, Sgt. Kole issued weapons and ammo to a
section of assault troops. Assisted by Maje, and including Corporal J. Shagaya,
the group advanced to the Officers Mess under the direction of the duty officer,
Lt. Pam Mwadkon, younger brother of the late Lt. Col James Pam who was shot in
Ikoyi by Major Christian Anuforo in January.
Once in the mess they ordered all officers present to raise their hands. When
Okonweze challenged them, he was summarily executed right there and then. Major
John Obienu, Commander of the Recce Squadron, sitting next to Okonweze, was also
shot dead. Lt. E Orok, driving in to join them, saw what was happening, shouted
at the soldiers, and was himself shot dead right under the tree where he parked
his car. In the chaos, some northerners were shot too, notably Lt. Gabriel
Idoko, mistaken for Igbo because he was wearing an "English dress". He was lucky
to survive. Some Igbo soldiers (other ranks) in the garrison were subsequently
rounded up and shot.
INITIAL CONTACTS WITH IBADAN, LAGOS, ENUGU, AND KADUNA
Not all Igbo officers in the Abeokuta garrison were killed. Ogbonna escaped and
was the one who initially made urgent informal phone calls to Lagos (2nd
Battalion), Ibadan (4th battalion) and much later to Enugu (to Lt. Cols Ogunewe
- 1st Bn - and Ojukwu at the State House).
Almost simultaneously, Lt. Pam phoned Lt. Garba Dada (Paiko), the Adjutant of
the 4th Battalion in Ibadan at Mokola Barracks saying "Look, we have done our
own oh! If you people just siddon there, we have finished our own.......We have
finished the Igbo officers here. We liberated our unit." He was wrong, though,
because Ogbonna was alive. Lt. John Okoli also survived.
When Captains Remawa and Bali returned to the Barracks from town, they met the
dead bodies of Okonweze, Obienu and Orok in or around the mess. They changed
quickly into combat dress and got themselves armed.
Captain Remawa then contacted Army HQ in Lagos to notify Lt. Col. Gowon of
events. Gowon ordered Remawa to collect the corpses, secure the garrison, and
await further instructions. This order from Gowon to Remawa sent shivers down
the spines of the junior northern officers at Abeokuta like Lt. DS Abubakar who
feared that they would all be arrested for the killings in the Mess. Therefore,
they decided that come what may, they would fight to finish to ensure the end of
the Ironsi regime. The impulse was primarily self preservatory.
Gowon then contacted Brigadier Ogundipe, then Chief of Staff, SHQ and got orders
to mobilize Army units in Lagos. Both Ogundipe and Gowon initially tried to
reach Ironsi directly in Ibadan and failed. (It was when Gowon was trying to get
Col. Njoku at the guest house that he spoke to Major Danjuma). Ogundipe then
notified the Police hierarchy, including the Commissioner in Ibadan, whose first
attempt to investigate events at the 4th battalion was strongly rebuffed by the
Battalion adjutant who told him to steer clear. "Flying Policeman" Mr. Joseph
Adeola eventually got through to Government House Ibadan, sometime around 1 am
(some say 0030), to notify General Ironsi of events. (Adeola replaced Timothy
Omo-Bare as the Commissioner of Police in the Midwest and was one of those
kidnapped by Biafran forces to Enugu in August 1967.)
By this time Major Danjuma, Lt. James Onoja and elements of the 4th battalion
were in process of arriving to cordon off the building.
Before he was finally arrested shortly before 8am, Ironsi had made requests for
a Police helicopter from Lagos and made other efforts, as are described
elsewhere in this essay, to mobilize loyal units. By the time a helicopter
arrived, though, he and Colonel Fajuyi had been taken away. General Ironsi's
last formal military contact was with Kaduna to mobilize the 1st Brigade. The
commander, Lt. Col. Wellington "Papa" Bassey was not around so he spoke to Major
Samuel Ogbemudia, then the Brigade Major, telling him "All is not well."
Unfortunately, the Brigade was too far away to be of immediate tactical value,
even if it wanted to be.
Ogbonna's call to Lt. Col. Igboba at the 2nd battalion in Ikeja preceded
Remawa's call to Army HQ. Unfortunately, it was intercepted by Lts. Nuhu Nathan
and Malami Nassarawa. Nathan was the duty officer and had been contacted earlier
by Murtala Muhammed about the postponement of the coup. When Ogbonna gave him
the message to deliver to Igboba about events at Abeokuta, he immediately
contacted Murtala Muhammed instead, who, having just gotten off the phone with
the boys at Ibadan, finally realized that events were moving faster than he
thought initially. Muhammed gave the go ahead to Nathan and Nassarawa to
mobilize northern troops at Ikeja and launch operations to pre-empt predictable
efforts by the establishment to regain control. They secured the armoury,
distributed weapons selectively, and got busy rounding up Igbo soldiers.
Northern NCOs and ordinary soldiers later went wild. If their officers did not
explicitly give an order for an Igbo soldier to be shot they would shoot him
anyway and shout "accidental discharge, sah!"
Meanwhile, Muhammed began making rounds of Army units all over Lagos to see
things for himself and wake up other coupists in the Lagos area asking them to
"adjust to the new situation". Two of those he woke up himself were Captain JN
Garba and Lt. Paul Tarfa at the Federal Guard. As they were dressing up, the
call from Gowon came in. By the time Muhammed got to Ikeja, Captain Martin
Adamu, Lts. Nathan, Nassarawa, Muhammadu Buhari, Alfred Gom, Longboem and a
bunch of NCOs were already in control of the battalion, having executed several
Igbo soldiers and officers (including Major B Nnamani, one of the company
commanders) and arrested many others by cordoning off the quartermaster section
of the barracks or grabbing soldiers as they came out for morning PT. The
battalion commander, Lt. Col. Henry Igboba, narrowly escaped a dragnet deployed
around his house by Lt. Longboem and got away.
Muhammed reportedly gave orders to stop the killing, and focus instead on
securing the perimeter as well as approach roads and taking measures to ensure
the eventual success of their activities. Captain Martin Adamu went to Army HQ
and placed himself in the intelligence center to monitor information and
disseminate disinformation. Muhammed then contacted Abeokuta garrison directly
and asked Lts. DS Abubakar and Pam Nwadkon to fuel up, arm a troop each of
armoured vehicles (ferrets) and head out for Lagos and Ibadan respectively,
accompanied by a section of assault troops to provide support in case of any
shoot out with loyal troops being mobilized by Lt. Col. Gowon, Lt. Col. Anwunah,
Major Mobolaji Johnson and Brigadier Ogundipe from SHQ. Sergeant Paul Dickson, a
fearsome Idoma NCO who was later to acquire a reputation as a bloodthirsty
savage, was despatched to take Ikeja Airport. A typical example of a coded order
(in Hausa) for the murder of an Igbo captive was: "Take him to the house of
chiefs."
Later that morning, after Abubakar and Pam had left for Lagos and Ibadan,
northern NCOs from the Abeokuta garrison set up check points in town and decided
to pay a visit to the Abeokuta Prison where Major DO Okafor, former Federal
Guards Commander, January 15 co-conspirator and alleged co-executioner of the
late Prime Minister was held. He was tortured and killed in the courtyard, some
say buried alive. The soldiers did not stop there. At one of the checkpoints,
2/Lt A.O. Olaniyan, oblivious of events, was stopped. As he tried to identify
himself, he was summarily shot dead. The situation was clearly out of control.
LAGOS, JULY 29, 1966
After being alerted, first by Lt. Col. Muhammed, then Lt. Col. Gowon, Captain
Garba and Lt. Tarfa secured the Federal (then known as 'National') Guards
Barracks at Obalende, better known as 'Dodan Barracks'. It is named after a town
called Dodan in the Arakan peninsula in Burma where Nigerians fought back in
World War 2. They rounded up all Igbo soldiers and locked them up in safety. Not
a single Igbo soldier in that unit lost his life. Garba and Tarfa overcame a
challenge by a northern soldier called Adamu Lamurde who emotionally threatened
to kill them both if he was not allowed to avenge the death of Brigadier
Maimalari by liquidating the Igbo soldiers in the unit. Indeed, this achievement
was one of the very few successes of northern officers against northern NCOs
seeking revenge. Garba later got a letter of commendation and appreciation from
Col Hilary Njoku, his erstwhile Brigade Commander, when all the Igbo soldiers
including Sergeant Vidal, Private Oligbo, Private Calistus Chukwu and others in
the unit eventually arrived back safely in the east.
After Lt. Col. Gowon completed the first round of calls to Army commanders in
Lagos early that morning, a decision was made to establish an operations room at
the Police HQ on Moloney Street in Lagos. Brigadier B. Ogundipe, then Chief of
Staff, SHQ, was joined by acting Police IG Kam Salem, Commodore Wey of the Navy,
Lt. Col. Gowon (Army COS), Lt. Col. Anwunah (PSO I), and Major Mobolaji Johnson.
Although he had previously served as DAQMG at the 2nd Brigade in Apapa under
late Brigadier Maimalari, on this day Johnson was a fish out of water because he
was supposed to be the second-in-command to Lt. Col Akahan at the 4th battalion
100 miles away in Ibadan where junior officers had run amock. However, he had
long since settled down as Lagos military administrator. The commander of the
2nd battalion at Ikeja could not be reached.
Meanwhile, Lt. DS Abubakar had arrived from Abeokuta with his troops of ferrets,
only to run into an ambush mounted by troops from the 2nd battalion under Lt.
Longboem at Ikeja from which he was very lucky to escape. Longboem had
recognized him at the last minute when he stuck his head out of the hatch.
Apparently Lt. Nassarawa had forgotten to alert the boys that Abubakar was
coming with ferrets on Muhammed's orders. Anyway, once this misunderstanding was
resolved, Muhammed deployed DS Abubakar to Abalti Barrracks for "mopping
operations". This essentially meant that Muhammed was now in control of Ikeja,
Dodan and Abalti Barracks as well as the airport. Indeed, Sergeant Dickson's
boys took control of two BOAC VC10 aircraft at the airport and ordered the
Captains to fly northern families of soldiers back to Kano before returning to
Lagos to pick commercial passengers. The soldiers involved had been completely
taken in by frivolous rumors of a "second Igbo coup" and, like northern civil
servants, wanted to get their families away.
After a quick appreciation, a decision was made by Brigadier Ogundipe to scrap
together a fighting force from Army HQ elements commanded by an Igbo Captain.
They were to go to Ikeja and try regaining control of the airport, by then under
the control of Sergeant Paul Dickson of the 2nd battalion. This group advanced
right into an ambush of machine gun nests along Ikeja road, losing about 30
soldiers in the process. In the confusion, two expatriates (including the
General Manager of Bata Shoes in Lagos) were killed in cross-fire.
Lt. Col. Gowon volunteered to go to Ikeja Barracks to negotiate with the
rebellious troops. By this time he and Brigadier Ogundipe were already aware
from reports coming from Ibadan that General Ironsi and Colonel Fajuyi had been
snatched from Major Danjuma and were probably dead. When he arrived at Ikeja
some reports say he was initially detained, but there is no corroborative
evidence that this really occurred. Aghast at what he saw, he was, however, said
to have issued orders in support of Muhammed's earlier orders that there should
be no more shooting. This order was quickly sidelined by northern soldiers who
proceeded to use other methods, not firearms, to slaughter their victims.
Daggers and other more primitive contraptions for ritual murder became weapons
of choice. In one illustrative case, northern soldiers at Ikeja airport took
Captain Okoye, then based at Abalti Barracks but enroute to the US on a course,
tied him to an Iron cross, whipped him unconscious and then left him to die in
the guardroom. Okoye was suspected of being an informant for the Igbo
underground network in Lagos.
About this time, first Major Johnson and then Brigadier Ogundipe himself gave an
order to a northern NCO deployed to the Federal Guards Company. The soldier
blatantly said he would not take orders from the Brigadier unless approved by
Captain JN Garba. So, Captain Garba was sent for and came to the Police HQ. He
was initially interrogated by Lt. Col. Anwunah, searching for information about
what was happening in the country. Garba then aggressively confronted Anwunah
with the grievances of northern soldiers and why they had struck. When Anwunah
reported Garba's intransigence to Ogundipe, Ogundipe told Garba: "I wish you
boys had waited. I have just received the report about the January coup this
morning and it's on my table right now. Try to talk to your friends in Ikeja,
and I am sure we can settle this matter, even at this stage."
Capt. Garba, now placed in a difficult position, went back to his office to make
a call to Murtala Muhammed in Ikeja and brief him about what had just
transpired. Muhammed endorsed Garba's actions and instructed him to maintain
contact. Garba says he later discovered that Ogundipe had been bluffing about
the report. Indeed, at the Military Leaders Meeting at Aburi, a full six months
later, Commodore Wey said: "A decision has been taken on the boys of 15th
January....They were to be dealt with in August but later on it was shifted to
October."
Meanwhile, Brigadier Ogundipe made a public broadcast on Radio Nigeria at 2:30pm
which was repeated in 30 minute cycles until about 8:30pm:
As a result of some trouble by dissidents in the army, mainly in Ibadan,
Abeokuta and Ikeja, the National Military Government has declared a state of
emergency in the affected areas. Consequently, the following areas have been
declared military areas under the Suppression of Disorder Decree of 1966:
Ibadan, Ikeja and Abeokuta. Military Tribunals have been considered and
accordingly set up. Curfew has been declared in the affected areas from 6:30 pm.
The National Military Government wishes to state that the situation is under
control and hopes to restore peace and tranquility very soon. The government
appeals to the public for cooperation in its effort to restore law and order in
the affected areas.
At about 3pm, though, Ogundipe sent for Garba again and instructed him to
contribute a platoon to a second assault force which he was sending to dislodge
the boys at Ikeja. Garba notified Muhammed at Ikeja and then contributed a
platoon to Ogundipe under one 2/Lt. Osuma (then known as "Usman") with separate
orders that should he be ordered to shoot at fellow soldiers he was to refuse
and return to base. 2/Lt. "Usman" did exactly as he was told before subsequently
escaping from Lagos on August 1st himself. When he got back to the east, he used
his real name (Osuma) to request that his property be sent back to him there.
Needless to say that Ogundipe's second attempt to establish military supremacy
had failed.
Meanwhile phone calls and signals were coming in from other parts of the
country, including Enugu (from Lt. Col. C. Ojukwu, the governor). At one point
Ojukwu was able to speak to Lt. Col. Gowon at Ikeja. It is said that Gowon told
him that he was no longer a "free agent". Ojukwu encouraged Ogundipe to keep
fighting even though he himself at one point escaped from Enugu to Onitsha from
where he was calling Ogundipe. The rebels later made Brigadier Ogundipe aware
that they would only accept Captain JN Garba as his intermediary for
negotiations. Meanwhile, angry about the phone calls from Ojukwu, Lt. Col.
Muhammed began making plans to march on Enugu - from which he was eventually
restrained.
LAGOS, SATURDAY JULY 30, 1966
At about 0600 hrs, Capt. JN Garba was ordered back to Police HQ. Over the course
of that day he made three trips back and forth to Ikeja on behalf of Brigadier
Ogundipe, including one trip in which his vehicle was even shot at by northern
troops. Emotional demands were made back and forth, including initial
declarations that they no longer wanted to share barracks with Igbo soldiers,
and demands that either the North be allowed to secede or that the Unification
decree be repealed with a return to the position before January 15 under a
civilian government. As John de St. Jorre put it, "It was the northern soldiers,
roaming around outside the conference room in their dark, satanic mood, who were
the ultimate arbiters of power".
It was during this back and forth ado that Gowon is said to have been
pressurized by the soldiers at Ikeja to participate in the discussions and lead
them as the senior northern officer. This may have been assisted by calls from
Kaduna and Kano by Lt. Cols Hassan Katsina and Mohammed Shuwa. Having been
alerted overnight of goings on, Ojukwu had now joined the chorus of phone calls
and signals coming in from other parts of the country seeking clarification. He
was even able to speak to Lt. Col. Gowon at Ikeja. It is said that Gowon told
him that he was no longer a "free agent". Ojukwu encouraged Ogundipe to keep
fighting even though he himself at one point escaped from Enugu to Onitsha from
where he was calling Ogundipe. Angry about the phone calls from Ojukwu, Lt. Col.
Muhammed began making plans to march on Enugu - from which he was eventually
restrained.
Another authority (Kirk-Greene) claims that Gowon's change of status from
government messenger to rebel representative occurred when Ogundipe declared
that he could not accept the proposals being put forward by northern soldiers
and wanted to remove himself from the negotiation seeing as he could not exert
his authority over them. Indeed Captain Alfred Gom had bluntly told him that
they no longer wanted to deal with him or the SHQ at all. More recently, Gowon
has revealed that main grouse the mutinous soldiers at Ikeja had against dealing
with and accepting orders from Ogundipe was that he had sent two separate
assault teams to attack them. General Olusegun Obasanjo, however, thinks an
additional reason was that Ogundipe "did not belong". According to Biafran
propaganda, a northern flag was even flown at this point over the Ikeja
Barracks, but no other independent source, local or foreign has ever confirmed
this allegation.
Meanwhile Lt. DS Abubakar of the 2 Recce Squadron Abeokuta and his troops of
Ferrets were ordered from Lagos to Ikeja Barracks. But he was first ordered to
secure Carter Bridge which was when he told the notorious Sergeant Lapdam to man
the checkpoint while he left for Ikeja. Lapdam later shot Major Ibanga Ekanem,
Provost Marshall, who was on his way to SHQ, allegedly with a list of northern
officers who were behind the revolt. [As a Captain, Ekanem survived injuries
sustained in combat as an officer in the 4QNR in Katanga during Congo Operations
in 1961]. Quite a few other soldiers (and possibly civilians) were also killed
on Carter Bridge and at least two southern airforce officers later rescued from
him. When Lt. DS Abubakar got to Ikeja, as reported in the Army's official
history, Col. DS Abubakar (rtd) recalls that one of those who was most strident
about separation was Lt. Nuhu Nathan who reportedly told Gowon:
"Let us all leave now - we all go back if we cannot form a confederation". Gowon
replied: What is that word you mentioned"? Nathan said "Confederation", to which
Gowon retorted: "What does that mean"? As Nathan proceeded to explain, Lt.
Malami Nassarawa said "I have an encyclopedia". DS Abubakar explains that "They
brought an encyclopedia and Gowon saw the meaning of confederation in it. He was
about to buy the idea - thank GOD the British High Commissioner and some of the
permanent secretaries advised against it." DS Abubakar says 'the British High
Commissioner said: "If you dare do this kind of thing - confederation - that is
the end of you". So that is why we came back to federalism.'
Others who were present include Lt. Col. Murtala Muhammed, Major Shittu Alao and
Captain Baba Usman.
While Captain Garba was away on his second visit to Ikeja, Federal Permanent
Secretaries met with Brigadier Ogundipe at the Police HQ. He told them that the
soldiers at Ikeja were not willing nor ready to assume responsibility for
running the country at that point. On his part he was not ready to do so either
unless he had both legal and military backing.
Although he had suspicions that Ironsi was already dead he was not absolutely
certain. To compound Ogundipe's position, the Attorney General , GC Onyiuke
advised him that there was no provision for an acting Supreme Commander in the
Constitution, as amended by Decree No. 1 of 1966.
Having rendered this advice, Onyiuke left Ogundipe at the Police HQ and then
proceeded to depart Lagos for safety. Others did too, abandoning him and Wey
there with no clear answers.
During Garba's third visit to the Ikeja Barracks he was accompanied by the
delegation of senior civil servants including Musa Daggash, Abdul Aziz Attach,
HA Ejueyitchie, Yusuf Gobir, BN Okagbue, Ibrahim Damcida, Allison Ayida, Phillip
Asiodu, along with Justice Adetokunbo Ademola, acting Police IG Kam Salem, Sule
Katagum, Muktar Tahir, Justice Mohammed Bello, and Ali Akilu. When Garba arrived
at Ikeja with them, he confirms that Muhammed was the "leading personality" in
the room, doing most of the talking until he suddenly turned to Gowon and said:
"You are the senior, go ahead." This acquiescence may have been influenced by
other senior northern officers as noted previously, citing seniority. DS
Abubakar recalls that there was certainly an argument about who should take over
and Major Abba Kyari was even briefly mentioned. However, after Gowon took over
the discussions, Muhammed kept interrupting until Gowon had to turn to Muhammed
and say: "Look, it's either you have deferred to me and will allow me carry on
this discussion, or you have not, and you can continue." Garba pointedly recalls
that Allison Ayida, permanent Secretary for Economic development, forcefully
insisted that Nigeria not be broken up and kept repeating this view "despite the
fact that Murtala was from far from receptive to such a view; instead he was
constantly telling Ayida, his eyes red with rage, in effect to shut up."
After complex informal negotiations brokered by Lt. Col. David Ejoor, Military
Governor of the Midwest, involving Commodore Wey and Lt. Col Hassan Katsina,
Gowon was finally quietly sworn in late that day, Saturday July 30, 1966, at
Ikeja but he did not make an announcement to the nation until Monday August 1st.
He spent the time notifying senior Police officers like Kam Salem and Hamman
Maiduguri, getting information and consolidating his 'control' over other parts
of the country - except, as later became apparent, the eastern region. In an
interview with Elaigwu, Gowon described his emotions when he was anointed as
C-in-C as follows:
Honestly, I felt as if I was under a battle. I had a feeling of death -
virtually choking me. I felt my throat go dry immediately. I was cold and yet
sweating. If I could then I would have run away. But two things kept me on -
one, a strong belief in God who had seen me through the Congo and two, a number
of questions I kept asking myself - 'Are you not a man? Are you not a soldier?
'What would people and history say of you?' ..My first objective was to restore
discipline in the army and to prevent killings. I called the soldiers, and as I
stood on the rostrum, tears were in my eyes. I was angry and at the same time
moved. I told myself that if I cried, the soldiers would have had me. I took
courage and addressed them. I told them that if I heard of any more killing,
they should also remember that I was a soldier, and that I could and would,
kill.
In his speech to the nation on August 1st, Gowon said, among other things:
This is Lt. Col. Y. Gowon, Army Chief of Staff, speaking to you..I have been
brought to the position today of having to shoulder the great responsibilities
of this country and the armed forces with the consent of the majority of the
members of the Supreme Military Council as a result of the unfortunate incident
that occcurred on the early morning of 29th July, 1966...
...As a result of the recent events and the other previous similar ones, I have
come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this
wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our unitary system has not been
able to stand the test of time. I have already remarked on the issues in
question. Suffice to say that, putting all considerations to test - political,
economic, as well as social - the base for unity is not there or is so badly
rocked, not only once but several times. I, therefore, feel that we should
review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help stop the
country from drifting away into utter destruction.
All members of the armed forces are requested to keep within their barracks
except on essential duties and when ordered from SHQ. Troops must not terrorize
the public, as such action will discredit the new National Military
Government.." "
I promise you that I shall do all I can to return to civil rule as soon as it
can be arranged. I also intend to pursue most vigorously the question of the
release of political prisoners. Fellow countrymen, give me your support and I
shall endeavour to live up to expectations. Thank you."
Shortly thereafter, on the same day, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, Military Governor of the
East, made a counter-broadcast from Enugu. The next morning Gowon signed an
instrument of pardon for Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Chief Anthony Enahoro, and
others who had been convicted and jailed in September 1963 for treasonable
felony, conspiracy to commit a felony and conspiracy to effect an unlawful
purpose in 1962 with the object of forcefully removing Alhaji Tafawa Balewa from
office as Prime Minister.
On August 3rd, Lt. Col. David Ejoor made a public speech as the Military
Governor of the Midwest, in support of the new regime. Likewise, on August 4,
Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo, Military Governor of the West, broadcast his support
for the new government as Gowon was addressing a press conference at the Lagos
City Hall, having earlier that day released Isaac Boro and others. Gowon was
later to announce his plans for return to civilian rule four days later,
followed the next day by a meeting of delegates representing the Regional
Military Governors.
However, Gowon or no Gowon, northern NCOs were still running amock killing
people arbitrarily, even threatening northern officers who stood in their way.
Lt. DS Abubakar was very nearly shot at Ikeja airport in this manner by one
Edward William allegedly for "hiding some Igbo people". Lagos Garrison
Commander, Lt. Col. Eze, barely escaped a mob of northern soldiers on August 2nd
but his staff officer, Captain Iloputaife, was not so lucky. Indeed, a few days
after the mutiny, a northern corporal at Ikeja summarized his own motives for
the mutiny by telling Norman Miners: "The Ibos killed our leaders in January;
they were taking all the top jobs; we had to get rid of them. Now we have only
got Northerners in this barracks; all the Southerners have run away." In fact
northern NCOs and soldiers were in the habit of taking uniforms of dead Igbo
officers and NCOs and wearing their ranks. On August 8, all Igbo soldiers at the
Army workshop in Yaba were expelled. But as the nation was to find out, the
worst was yet to come. Colonel DS Abubakar (rtd) recalls: At that time, if an
other rank does not like the face of another person he will just kill him like
an animal and nobody will do anything."
But it would be simplistic to presume that some northern officers did not take
part in the killings in Lagos. Lt. Nuhu Nathan, for example, was later
personally credited in eastern publications with the execution of some Igbo
soldiers at Ikeja. There were undoubtedly others.
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Very Special thanks to the Dr Nowa Omoigui.........Overthrow General Ironsi
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